Undergraduate Review
Volume 14 Special Issue: Canada and the United
States in the Age of Trump

Article 1

2019

Undergraduate Review, Special Issue: Canada and
the United States in the Age of Trump, Vol. 14, Issue
2

Follow this and additional works at: https://vc.bridgew.edu/undergrad_rev
Recommended Citation
(2019). Undergraduate Review, Special Issue: Canada and the United States in the Age of Trump, Vol. 14, Issue 2. Undergraduate
Review, 14.
Available at: https://vc.bridgew.edu/undergrad_rev/vol14/iss2/1

This item is available as part of Virtual Commons, the open-access institutional repository of Bridgewater State University, Bridgewater, Massachusetts.
Copyright © 2019

The Undergraduate
Review
A JOURNAL OF UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH AND CREATIVE WORK

Special Issue
Canada and the United States in the Age of Trump
2018

Webster, Stokes, Jones, Best, Cunningham, Guimond and Krouse, Kurajian, Hogan-Berisha and
Merritt, Alderton

The Undergraduate Review
A JOURNAL OF UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH AND CREATIVE WORK

Special Issue
Canada and the United States in the Age of Trump
2018
Editor in Chief
Jenny Olin Shanahan, PhD
Guest Editor
Andrew C. Holman, PhD
Director, Canadian Studies Program
Layout
Curtis St-Jean
Contact Information:
Office of Undergraduate Research
Center for Transformative Learning
330 Maxwell Library
10 Shaw Road
Bridgewater State University
Bridgewater, MA 02325
508-531-2085
http://vc.bridgew.edu/undergrad_rev/
© Bridgewater State University 2019

2 • The Undergraduate Review • Special Issue • 2018

BRIDGEWATER STATE UNIVERSITY

Table of Contents
Indigenous Self-government? An Assessment of the Nisga’a Treaty Agreement
Jacob Webster (McGill University) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA): Potential Changes, Effects, and What to Do Concerning
the Trucking Industry
Shyla Stokes with Richard Stumpenhagen (Bridgewater State University) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
17
Renegotiating the Realm of Influence: The Shifting Priorities of President Trump during NAFTA Renegotiations
Sanford Jones (University of Ottawa) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
28
The Klan Issue: How French Canadians Combatted Nativism through 1920 Maine Local Politics
Erin Best (Bridgewater State Universtity) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

38

Liquefied Natural Gas in North America: An Analysis of the United States’ Exportation Position in the Context
of its North American Free Trade Agreement Partners
Sean Cunningham (SUNY Buffalo) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
45
The End of NAFTA and a Future for Companies in the Medical Device Industry
Melissa Guimond and Jennifer Krouse, with Kyle Beauregard (Bridgewater State University) . . . . . . . . .

58

Debunking the Narratives of Inclusion : Immigration Policy in Quebec, Canada, and the United States in the Age
of Trump
Olivia A. Kurajian (McGill University) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
68
Fiat Chrysler Automobiles and NAFTA’s Rule-of-Origin Clause
Christine Hogan-Berisha and Parker Merritt (Bridgewater State University) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

76

Aliens vs Citizens: Who are the Real Enemies of the State?
Sheldon Alderton (University of Saskatchewan) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

90

BRIDGEWATER STATE UNIVERSITY

3 • The Undergraduate Review • Special Issue • 2018

From the Guest Editor
In March 2018, 95 undergraduate students from a variety of post-secondary institutions across North America
gathered at Bridgewater State University to meet and share with one another their research and writing on current
and historical subjects involving Canada, Quebec, and the United States. The one-day symposium was co-hosted
by BSU’s Canadian Studies Program and Undergraduate Research Office, and generously supported by the Government of Canada’s Consulate for New England and the province of Quebec’s government office in Boston. Named
“Canada, the United States and Quebec in the Age of Trump,” the event featured the insights of students from BSU
and other schools: Emerson College and SUNY-Buffalo in the United States; Carleton, McGill, Queen’s, Thompson
Rivers, and Western universities, along with the University of Saskatchewan and the University of Ottawa in Canada. Presenting singly and in teams, they analyzed the future of NAFTA, refugee policy and immigration reform, the
president and the prime minister, Indigenous rights and Reconciliation, and health-care provision in Canada and
the United States. One highlight of the symposium was a keynote address delivered by Dr. Michael Hawes, CEO of
Fulbright Canada and a leading proponent of student research and scholar exchange between Canada and the U.S.
The high quality of presentations made on that day (and the enthusiasm that the event generated) inspired the publication of a special issue of The Undergraduate Review, BSU’s established undergraduate research journal. The essays
featured in these pages showcase the hard work and the heights of insightful analysis that undergraduate research
can entail. They demonstrate, clearly, how polished research and writing has become a central part of undergraduate
learning for many students, in many institutions across North America. All of us in the Canadian Studies Program at
BSU, now in its forty-sixth year of existence, were thrilled to be co-host of this event and we look forward to reprising it in coming years.
Dr. Andrew C. Holman
Director, Canadian Studies Program
From the Editor of The Undergraduate Review
Bridgewater State University (BSU) has built a signature program of Undergraduate Research with significant funding and opportunities for students in any major to discover new knowledge and make original contributions to their
discipline or community. Undergraduate Research has been an institutional priority at BSU for more than 20 years
because students who are mentored by professors on projects in which they are deeply invested, gain highly valued
experience and skills in critical thinking, problem-solving, collaboration, and communication. The experience of
conducting authentic research under faculty mentorship makes undergraduates more successful students and outstanding candidates for post-graduation competitive opportunities, thereby changing the trajectories of their lives.
Undergraduate Research includes the scholarly work from any academic field, and can take several different forms,
from collaborating with professors on their scholarship to taking on long-term course assignments that go beyond
traditional research papers and projects, such as by including a presentation of the results at a campus or disciplinary
symposium. Dissemination of one’s findings is a key criterion of high-impact Undergraduate Research. When
students share their work with an audience of peers, experts, and others in the academic and broader community,
they become much more invested in the work than if they were “writing to the professor” to earn a passing course
grade. They think more intentionally about the audience, purpose, and overall quality of the research and writing.
They also develop deeper understanding of their areas of study as they reflect on and respond to audience members’
questions.
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For all of those reasons, BSU is proud to have hosted the “Canada, the United States and Quebec in the Age of
Trump” undergraduate-research conference and to publish some of the highest quality research presented there in
this special issue of The Undergraduate Review.
Dr. Jenny Shanahan
Assistant Provost
Center for Transformative Learning
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Indigenous Self-government?
An Assessment of the Nisga’a
Treaty Agreement
JACOB WEBSTER

O

ver the course of Canadian history,
Indigenous peoples have endured a
difficult relationship with the state.
This relationship is indicative of the
history of colonialism in Canada and continues be
problematic in contemporary interactions between
Canadian First Nations and the federal and provincial
governments. The question of how Indigenous peoples
fit into the Canadian federal system is a complex one
whose answer depends largely on the specific contextual
situation of each First Nations group. In this essay, I
argue that the Nisga’a Treaty1 agreement exemplifies a
commendable attempt at Indigenous self-government,
which is consistent with the principles evoked in the
Charlottetown Accord2 and in the scholarship on
Indigenous self-government. In this way, the Nisga’a
treaty sets up a model for Indigenous self-government
that does not require constitutional change and is thus

Signed on 27 May 1998, the Nisga’a Treaty was negotiated and
signed by the Nisga’a nation, the Province of British Columbia and
the Government of Canada, ostensibly to settle outstanding land
claims. It went into effect on 11 May 2000.
1

The Charlottetown Accord was a package of proposed
amendments to the Canadian Constitution that were considered
by the provinces of Canada and the Canadian federal government
in 1992, but was ultimately rejected. Among the reforms was a
proposal to enshrine an Aboriginal right to self-government in the
Constitution.
2
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possible in the current constitutional context. The
Nisga’a Treaty has withstood two judicial challenges
and was informed by current constitutional principles
(Aldridge and Fenge, 2015, 149). Because of its
affirmed constitutionality, the Nisga’a Treaty provides
a way forward within the current federal framework
and provides a replicable example for First Nations. In
order to argue that the Nisga’a Treaty creates a model
for Indigenous self-government that is consistent with
the theoretical ideals of Indigenous self-government, I
first outline the principles evoked by the Charlottetown
Accord and by scholars in the field of Indigenous selfgovernment. I then summarize the text of the Nisga’a
agreement, identifying relevant sections that coincide
or potentially conflict with the theoretical principles
proposed in the first section. In order to conduct a more
fulsome examination of the Nisga’a agreement, I also
examine recent studies that endeavor to evaluate the
success of the Nisga’a agreement based on its practical
implementation in the community, not simply on the
text of the agreement. By examining the text and the
practical implementation of the agreement, I argue that
the Nisga’a treaty agreement provides the framework for
Indigenous self-government in a way that is consistent
with the theoretical principles identified by the
Charlottetown Accord and certain scholars. The Nisga’a
treaty is a sound implementation of Indigenous selfgovernment that is possible without any constitutional
change.
Theoretical Principles
In identifying the opinions of scholars on the principles
of Indigenous self-government, it is necessary to
identify the vein in the literature that proposes that
negotiations between settler government and native
peoples are inherently colonial. This method of thinking
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provides little room for negotiation or compromise, but
identifying this viewpoint is important. Paul Rynard’s
work is emblematic of this critique of settler-Indigenous
relations. Rynard generally disapproves of the Nisga’a
agreement arguing that it does not represent a break
from the past in the sense that it follows the same
colonial channels of settler-Indigenous relations (2000).
Furthermore, Rynard argues that the land negotiations
between the Nisga’a and the state perpetuate a legal
relationship of dependence of First Nations on the state
that is inherently colonial (Rynard, 2000 p.240). While
this critique is important and should be identified,
it is not emblematic of other larger themes within
the literature and precludes any state-First Nations
agreement to help install self-government within the
current constitutional structure. Rynard’s principles are
valuable but are largely unrealistic given the unlikelihood
of broad constitutional change.
While Rynard’s critique and principles are
unrealistic given the current constitutional regime,
the Charlottetown Accord and the work of other
scholars present their own frameworks that are more
practically suitable for an assessment of the Nisga’a treaty
agreement.
While the Charlottetown Accord failed in a
national referendum in 1992, it nonetheless identified
guiding principles for what its authors proposed as a
“third order” of government. The Accord states that
the Indigenous peoples of Canada, due to their status
as the first peoples of Canada, have a right to govern
their land and to promote their languages, cultures
and traditions (Charlottetown Accord, 1985, S.2(b)).
It further identifies their right to govern their own
economies, identities and institutions (Charlottetown
Accord, 1985, p.A s.4). It also states that the provincial
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and federal governments have a duty to negotiate
with Indigenous peoples on issues of jurisdiction and
on the use of resources and assets on Native lands
(Charlottetown Accord, 1985, p.B s.45). Finally, it states
that the financing of these self-government agreements
should be negotiated in a way that promotes equal
opportunity and furthers social, economic, and cultural
development (Charlottetown Accord, 1985, p. B s.50).
The Charlottetown Accord, despite its failure, identified
certain key policy areas, notably culture, identity, and
institutions that should frame any assessment of an
Indigenous self-government regime.
Scholarship on Indigenous self-government
further clarifies the vision set forth in the Charlottetown
Accord. Dan Russell identifies the Penner Report3 as
the impetus for self-government and the importance
of its recommendations for “expanded jurisdiction of
first nations governments, the exclusion of provincial
jurisdiction from Indigenous lands, and a process of First
Nations accountability to Indigenous people” (2000,
7). Furthermore, he argues that if self-government has
any content at all it must mean the ability to enact
laws concerning crime, health care, and education all
enforceable by Indigenous courts (Russell, 2000, 11).
In this argument, Russell asserts that First Nations
governments must have their own judicial enforcement
mechanisms to execute their own legislation.

In 1983, a Special Parliamentary Committee on Indian Selfgovernment released The Penner Report, named after its chairman,
Keith Penner, a Liberal Member of Parliament for CochraneSuperior. The Report recommended that Canada’s Indian Act
and the Department of Indian Affairs be phased out gradually
and replaced by local governments established by Native peoples
themselves.
3
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Wayne Warry takes a different approach to
Indigenous self-government, proposing that it should
be up to the First Nations groups to determine the
legitimate parameters of self-government (1998, 36).
He argues that self-government is an iterative process
in which its meaning becomes clearer through its
implementation and practice (1998, 49). Warry’s
approach differs greatly from Russell’s and he seeks to
grant agency to Indigenous peoples in their specific
contexts to determine what their legitimate form of selfgovernment will mean given the needs of their individual
communities. Warry does not provide criteria in the
way Russell does, but nonetheless helps inform what
Indigenous self-government would look like in saying
that it recognizes the right and ability of individuals and
communities to conduct their own affairs (1998, 50).

on the ground. The guiding principle identified in
all the sources is Indigenous control over Indigenous
affairs, and a distancing from the federal and provincial
governments from business that is internal to First
Nations communities. More specifically, self-government
agreements ought to include provisions for Indigenous
control over language, culture, economy, identity,
institutions, traditions, and land. Furthermore, as
Russell asserts, these agreements ought to include
enforcement mechanisms, whether they be courts or
other institutions, to enforce laws made by Indigenous
governments. After outlining his principles, Russell
asserts that the real question is not what Indigenous selfgovernment ought to look like, but “can it be done?”
(2000, 89). By examining the Nisga’a Treaty, I argue that
Russell’s question can be answered in the affirmative.

Tim Schouls provides further clarity to the
question of what Indigenous self-government will and
ought to mean on the ground. Firstly, he states that selfgovernment should be principally to preserve Indigenous
culture (Schouls, 2003, 45). While cultural preservation
should be the chief concern of any self-government
regime, Schouls clarifies by stating, “Self government is
understood to be fundamentally about the expression
of an Indigenous desire for control over internal affairs”
(2003, 178). This is an important stipulation in Schouls’
statement as it implies a degree of autonomy from the
Canadian state that extends the tribe’s authority only
to members of the tribe and to matters that are internal
to their own community. In this, Schouls argues for a
degree of separation between Indigenous communities
and the Canadian state.

The Nisga’a Treaty Agreement

Viewed together, the Charlottetown Accord
and the scholarly literature on the topic help clarify
what Indigenous self-government should look like
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The Nisga’a Treaty agreement is the first modernday treaty in British Columbia and in this it is novel
(Cassidy, 2004, 5). Given its novelty, it is imperative
to adjudicate the success of this paradigm based on the
theoretical principles identified in the preceding section.
In adjudicating the success of the agreement, I break
up my analysis into criteria identified in the literature
on self-government. The eight categories provided in
the literature to judge the success of the Nisga’a Treaty
are: general provisions, government structure, social
services, the judiciary, language and culture, lands and
assets, citizenship, and financing. By identifying how the
treaty addresses Nisga’a government on these issues and
adjudicating them based on the criteria established by
the relevant literature, it is possible to ascertain the value
of the Nisga’a agreement. Any study of the Nisga’a treaty
that ignores the actual text of the agreement would be
incomplete. Based largely on the text of the agreement,
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in this section I assess how well it fits with the criteria
established in the Charlottetown Accord and the relevant
scholarship.
Chapter two of the Nisga’a agreement sets out
certain general conditions that help frame it. Firstly, the
agreement does not alter the Constitution of Canada
and exists within the meaning of Sections 25 and 35 of
the Constitution Act, 1982 (Canada et. al. ch.2 s.1). The
Charter will still apply to Nisga’a governments, bearing
in mind “the free and democratic nature of Nisga’a
Government” (Canada et. al., 1999, ch.2 s.9). Finally,
while federal and provincial laws will still apply to the
Nisga’a, in the event of a conflict between these laws and
the agreement, the agreement will prevail (Canada et. al.,
1999, ch.2 s.13). These principles set the groundwork
for the rest of the agreement and support the supremacy
of the self-government agreement over any piece of
provincial or federal legislation.
One key principle identified in the literature
is that Indigenous governments ought to have control
over their institutions and governmental structures.
The agreement addresses this. The Nisga’a have the
jurisdiction to make laws concerning the establishment
of Nisga’a institutions (Canada et. al., 1999, ch. 11, s.
34). This includes the composition of their government,
its financial administration, and the conduct of
elections and referenda. The provisions for the Nisga’a
constitution enumerated in Chapter 11, Section Nine
are relatively vague, allowing for Nisga’a autonomy in
these areas. For example, while it mandates that the
Nisga’a provide a mechanism for challenging Nisga’a
laws it does not codify what this mechanism should
look like or establish a settler standard to which it
should conform (Canada et al.). In this way, it sets up
guiding principles but leaves the practical administration
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of these issues up to the Nisga’a and their members.
This method of structuring the Nisga’a government
allows for a relatively high degree of Nisga’a autonomy,
which is consistent with notions in the literature of
self-government as a process that must be determined
by Indigenous communities themselves. Furthermore,
the Nisga’a right to self-government is constitutionally
entrenched through this treaty, which means that
it cannot be ignored by the province or the federal
government (Cassidy, 2004, 8). The structure of the
Nisga’a government in general conforms to the standards
evoked by the literature by recognizing self-government
as an iterative process that is valuable to the extent that
First Nations groups have the autonomy to determine
their own internal constitutional structures.
The way the Nisga’a agreement addresses social
services provides an illustrative criterion by which
to judge the degree to which the agreement is selfgovernment. Generally speaking, the Nisga’a can make
laws creating social services (Canada et. al, 1999, ch. 11
s. 78). More specifically, the province and the federal
government have a responsibility to negotiate with the
Nisga’a on the administration and delivery of federal
and provincial social services by the Nisga’a themselves
(Canada et. al., 1999, ch. 11 s.78). This provision is
integral to the meaning of self-government because it
provides Nisga’a control over aspects of government
that are central to the well-being of Nisga’a members.
Furthermore, the agreement specifically addresses health
care, stating that the Nisga’a and the governments
will negotiate to reach agreement for health care for
individuals on the reserve, and in the instance that any
Nisga’a law regarding the structure or organization of
health services on Nisga’a lands contravenes federal or
provincial law, Nisga’a law will prevail (Canada et. al.,
1999, ch.11 s.84). Furthermore, the Nisga’a have the
9 • The Undergraduate Review • Special Issue • 2018

ability to regulate Indigenous healers on the reserve,
however they cannot regulate substances that are already
regulated by the federal or provincial governments
(Canada et. al., 1999, ch.11 s. 86). This provision is
mixed in terms of the degree to which it allows selfgovernment. Similarly mixed are the ways the agreement
provides for education on reserve. While the Nisga’a can
make laws regarding preschool to grade-12 education,
which includes the teaching of Nisga’a language and
culture, there are standards set forth by the province
(Canada et. al., 1999, ch.11 s. 100). Not only must
the Nisga’a education system prepare its graduates
to competently attend post-secondary education, it
must also permit the transfer of students to provincial
schools at each grade level (Canada et. al., 1999, ch.
11 s. 100). These provisions provide checks along the
way on Nisga’a education that reduce the ability of the
Nisga’a to innovate. But generally, Nisga’a language
and culture can be taught concurrently with provincial
standards provided students in each grade can achieve
at similar levels to students at provincially operated
schools. The vernacular surrounding the standards
by which the Nisga’a must conform to the province’s
regulation is very important in determining the
degree of Nisga’a autonomy. In terms of Nisga’a postsecondary institutions, the Treaty calls only for standards
“comparable” to those of the province on issues of
organization, admissions, instructor qualifications,
and curriculum (Canada et. al., 1999, ch. 11 s. 104).
Since Nisga’a standards need only be comparable to the
province’s, there is a degree of autonomy in this domain.
Overall, the provisions for social services in the Nisga’a
agreement are generally amenable to the principles
identified in the literature and provide for a system that
gives the Nisga’a a relatively high degree of autonomy in
regulating health services and education.
10 • The Undergraduate Review • Special Issue • 2018

As Russell argues, Indigenous law enforcement
is required for any Indigenous self-government regime
to be legitimate (2000, 11). The Nisga’a treaty fulfils this
requirement to a certain extent but falls down in certain
key areas. The Nisga’a have the jurisdiction to make laws
regulating or controlling actions on their land other
than actions that are authorized by the Crown or actions
that may constitute “nuisance, a trespass, a danger to
public health, or a threat to public order, peace, or
safety” (Canada et. al., ch.11 s. 59). The words in this
section are relatively vague, which makes it difficult
to adjudicate this section. Despite this ambiguity, the
Nisga’a do not have the authority to create criminal law
(Canada et. al., 1999, ch.11 s. 61). This is a significant
limit to Nisga’a judicial abilities. Furthermore, the
Nisga’a may not regulate gambling on their lands, which
is another infringement on the theoretical notions of
self-government (Canada et. al, 1999, ch.11 s. 108).
Despite these inadequacies in the treaty, Chapter 12,
which describes the “Administration of Justice,” provides
a clearer framework for Nisga’a judicial mechanisms.
This chapter provides for the Nisga’a to create their own
police force (Canada et. al. 1999, ch. 12 s.4). While the
force must be in “substantial conformity” to provincial
standards in terms of use of force by its officers and
codes of conduct, the treaty provides for a large degree
of autonomy in this area (Canada et. al., 1999, ch.
12 s.4). Furthermore, these police officers have all the
powers and responsibilities of peace officers under the
law (Canada et. al., 1999, ch.12 s.13). There is also a
reciprocal system whereby provincial police officers must
notify the Nisga’a police forces if they are performing
their duties in Nisga’a territory and vice versa (Canada
et. al., 1999, ch. 12 s.14-15). These sections set up a
notion of equality between the two police forces, which
symbolizes the equal status of the Nisga’a and provincial
BRIDGEWATER STATE UNIVERSITY

governments. Furthermore, the provisions whereby the
police force must be in substantial conformity with the
provinces provide not so much a limit on police power
as they do protection of citizens’ rights.
Not only can the Nisga’a establish a police
force with a relative degree of autonomy they are also
capable of establishing a system of courts provided they
comply with “generally recognized principles in respect
of judicial fairness, independence and impartiality
(Canada et. al., 1999, ch. 12 s.33). This section sets
forth criteria that are theoretical and non-specific,
which gives the Nisga’a a large degree of autonomy
in terms of the structure of their judicial system. This
autonomy affirms the theoretical principles of selfgovernment. Furthermore, the Nisga’a courts have
powers that are relatively far reaching. They can review
Nisga’a institutions, adjudicate based on Nisga’a law, and
adjudicate disputes within the jurisdiction of provincial
courts provided it is on Nisga’a land and involves Nisga’a
people. While the Nisga’a are unable to make criminal
law and are limited in their legislative ability on certain
other legal issues, the Treaty does set up enforcement
mechanisms that afford the Nisga’a a large degree of
autonomy. While the judicial set-up under the Nisga’a
agreement may not totally fulfil Russell’s criteria, it does
a respectable job in setting up autonomy for Nisga’a
courts and police forces to enforce Nisga’a law in Nisga’a
territory.
The criterion that is mentioned most commonly
in the literature as a litmus test for self-government is
the degree to which the Indigenous governments are
autonomous in matters of culture. On this issue, the
Nisga’a agreement is relatively strong. The agreement
states outright that “Nisga’a language and culture are
matters that should be subject to Nisga’a laws and
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governments, to as great an extent as possible” (Cassidy,
2004, 19). The Nisga’a have the authority to make laws
that promote and preserve their culture and language
(Canada et. al., 1999, ch. 11 s.41). Specifically, this
clause allows the Nisga’a to pass laws to authorize the
use, reproduction, and representation of Nisga’a cultural
symbols and practices, and the teaching of Nisga’a
language (Canada et. al., 1999, ch. 11 s.41). While
this provision is broad and gives the Nisga’a a large
degree of autonomy, it does not allow the Nisga’a to
legislate regarding intellectual property (Canada et. al.,
1999 ch.11 s.42). On this issue, the treaty is potentially
lacking in terms of its protection of Nisga’a culture but
other sections provide the Nisga’a with greater power.
For instance, the Nisga’a can control the devolution
of cultural property for people who die intestate and
Nisga’a governments can make laws forcing employers
to accommodate Nisga’a employees based on aspects of
Nisga’a culture (Canada et al., 1999, ch. 11 s. 115-16).
These provisions give the Nisga’a government control
over cultural materials and give Nisga’a residents a
greater ability to practice their culture. Chapter 17 sets
out the procedures by which the Nisga’a can reclaim
Nisga’a artifacts from the Canadian Museum of History
and the Royal British Columbia Museum. Chapter nine
also sets out provisions for the traditional Nisga’a harvest
of wildlife in the Nass Wildlife Reserve subject only to
provincial legislation for public health and conservation
(Canada et. al., 1999, ch. 17 s.1). This provision does
not require the Nisga’a to obtain hunting licenses
(Canada et. al., 1999, ch. 17 s.10). These provisions
allow for the reclamation of cultural artifacts and the
practice of traditional Nisga’a hunting rituals that allow
the Nisga’a to regulate their own traditional cultural
practices. While the agreement does not delegate the
ability to legislate based on state intellectual property
11 • The Undergraduate Review • Special Issue • 2018

laws, it does delegate autonomy in other important areas
and extends the Nisga’a ability to control and practice
their culture.
Like cultural considerations, issues concerning
land assets are frequently mentioned by scholars
identifying criteria by which to adjudicate Indigenous
self-government. The agreement states that the Nisga’a
can make laws regarding the use and management of
their lands (Canada et. al., 1999, ch.11 s.44). These laws
have a wide jurisdiction under Section 44 and include
the right to control how land is disposed of on Nisga’a
territory (Canada et. al., 1999, ch.11 S. 44,d). They have
the ability to regulate business on their land and can
zone, plan, and develop their land as they see fit (Canada
et. al., 1999, ch.11 s.47). Furthermore, the same criteria
for bird harvest in Chapter nine are made in Chapter
eight for fish harvest. The Nisga’a have the right to fish
on their lands subject only to provincial legislation on
public health and conservation and do not require a
government license (Canada et. al., 1999 , ch. 8 s.1, s.7).
Generally speaking, the Nisga’a treaty allows for a large
degree of autonomy in Nisga’a legislation on the use of
Nisga’a land and resources. This is consistent with the
criteria set out by the scholarship identified earlier.
Citizenship—that is, who is Nisga’a and who is
not—is an important part of any Indigenous agreement.
The criteria for citizenship are set forth in Chapter 20
of the agreement and are relatively restrictive. Nisga’a
citizens must be of Nisga’a ancestry either by being
born to a mother in the tribe, a descendant of such an
individual, an adopted child of a woman in the tribe,
or the spouse of one of said people (Canada et. al.,
1999, ch.9 S.1). These criteria are relatively restrictive
because they are based on an ancestral link to the Nisga’a
people. Furthermore, the Nisga’a have the authority
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to form an enrolment committee, one governed by
rules set out by the Nisga’a council that will adjudicate
cases of membership (Canada et. al., 1999, ch.9 s.11).
This effectively allows the Nisga’a to regulate their
membership and thus regulate access to Nisga’a lands
and the privileges of Nisga’a citizenship. This internal
mechanism whereby the Nisga’a can control membership
is integral to a the safeguarding of all other Nisga’a rights
under the agreement. There is an Appeal Board that
adjudicates references from the Enrolment Committee
and the appeals board is composed of Nisga’a and
government officials in equal numbers (Canada et.
al., 1999, s. 19 ch.9). The appeals process privileges
the Nisga’a and allows for the pre-eminence of Nisga’a
decision-making at all levels. It creates a framework of
self-government that encourages Nisga’a autonomy in
the critical area of membership.
While the agreement seems to satisfy notions
of self-government in crucial areas defined by scholars,
issues of financing are paramount to the practical
implementation of this agreement. With regard to
financing, the agreement sets forth a process that is very
fair to the Nisga’a. Chapter 15 describes the financing
agreement and states that every five years the parties
agree to negotiate financing that would enable the
agreed-upon public programs and services to Nisga’a
residents at levels that are reasonably comparable to
those in northwest British Columbia (Canada et. al.,
1999, ch. 15 s.3). This sets a relatively high standard
by which the province and the federal government
must provide financing to the Nisga’a government.
Furthermore, these calculations will take into account
the costs necessary to establish and operate the Nisga’a
government, the effectiveness of public programs, the
location of Nisga’a lands, training requirements, Nisga’a
cultural values, and the obligations of the Nisga’a
BRIDGEWATER STATE UNIVERSITY

government (Canada et. al., 1999, ch.15 s.9). This
clause widens the scope of the financing arrangement
taking into account important considerations that help
ensure the ability of the Nisga’a government to operate.
By taking into account the remoteness of Nisga’a
lands and Nisga’a cultural values, the agreement is
sensitive to the Nisga’a situation and helps facilitate selfgovernment. While the Nisga’a have the power to tax
their own citizens (Canada et. al., 1999, ch. 16 s.1), the
Nisga’a are also subject to governmental taxes—federal
and provincial (Canada et. al., 1999, ch. 16 s.6). The
subjection to governmental taxes is one that contravenes
the Indian Act but does not contravene the jurisdiction
of the Nisga’a government. In this way, while it may
be less than ideal for Nisga’a residents, taxation is not
necessarily an issue that lessens the degree to which the
agreement fulfils the notion of self-government.
Based on the text of the agreement, the Nisga’a
treaty fulfils to a large extent the theoretical principles
identified in the literature on self-government. The
Nisga’a have prevailing jurisdiction in several substantial
areas including government, citizenship, culture,
language, lands and assets, the organization and
structure of health services, child and family services,
and education (Cassidy, 2004, 10). Furthermore, the
agreement clarifies that the Nisga’a have the authority
to make laws that are necessarily incidental to exercising
their authority as set out by the agreement (Canada
et. al., 1999, ch.11 s. 126). While occasionally the
agreement stipulates that the state can regulate Nisga’a
government or that the Nisga’a cannot legislate on
certain issues, the agreement largely fulfils the theoretical
principles evoked in the relevant literature. In this
way, the Nisga’a acquire law-making authority in the
crucial areas of “lands, language, culture, education,
health, child protection, traditional healing practices,
BRIDGEWATER STATE UNIVERSITY

fisheries, wildlife, forestry, environmental protection,
and policing” (Allen, 2004, 235). While the actual text
of the agreement is consistent with the principles of
Indigenous self-government, the practical reality of how
the agreement is implemented is just as (if not more)
important.
A 2010 study by Joseph Quesnel and Conrad
Winn reports mixed results as to the effect of the
agreement on the quality of governance within the
Nisga’a community. They find that the funding from
the government is sufficient for the operation of Nisga’arun programs and that there is higher trust for the local
Nisga’a government than neighboring bands have for
their own governmental arrangements (Quesnel et.
al., 2011, 9). Despite this seemingly positive feedback,
they find no improvement in public opinion over the
government’s ability to keep promises, though there are
large concerns about nepotism among Nisga’a leadership
(Quesnel et. al., 2011, 11-12). Furthermore, they state
that there is difficulty for many members of the group
to live outside of the Indian Act framework (Quesnel
et. al., 2011, 16). Despite these mixed results, what we
understand as good government and as self-government
should not be conflated. While the immediate results of
the agreement are mixed as to their impact on improving
governance, the agreement provides a workable
framework for Nisga’a self-government, which is an
essentially positive goal. While the short-term effects
of self-government in the Nisga’a community may be
mixed, the creation of a workable regime for Indigenous
self-government within the current constitutional
framework is a notable accomplishment and a step
toward Indigenous self-government on a larger scale
that, as the literature demonstrates, is an essential step in
the advancement of Canadian Indigenous peoples.
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In conclusion, the question of how Indigenous
peoples should rightly interact with the state is one
that has prompted a vast amount of scholarship and
political discussion. The Nisga’a Treaty provides the
framework for an answer to the question of how
Canadian First Nations fit into the federal system. The
Nisga’a agreement does not provide for self-government
on every issue and, in some areas, there are standards
imposed by the provincial and federal governments.
But in most areas, the agreement mostly adheres to the
theoretical ideals proposed in the Charlottetown Accord
and in literature on self-government. While theory is
useful for crafting frameworks, policy that is negotiated
by three “orders” of government is rarely ideal. In this
way, the Nisga’a agreement provides a valuable example
for how Indigenous self-government can be realized
within the current constitutional framework to a degree
that substantially conforms to theoretical ideals. While
the practical implementation of the agreement has had
mixed effects in its improvement of governance for the
Nisga’a, good governance and self-government should
not be conflated, and self-government is a goal unto
itself for Indigenous peoples in Canada. While the
Nisga’a agreement is somewhat exceptional in that it
was instituted in an environment made conducive to
compromise by provincial and federal governments, it
still provides a model for future negotiations (Cassidy,
2004, 24). As Wayne Warry states, “Self-government
is an emergent, iterative process—its meaning and
validity become clearer with its practice” (1998, 49).
In implementing the Nisga’a agreement, Canadian
governments are supporting a forward-looking process
that is consistent with theoretical, ideal principles and
workable in the current constitutional context.
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The North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA):
Potential Changes,
Effects, and What to Do
Concerning the Trucking
Industry
SHYLA STOKES WITH RICHARD STUMPENHAGEN

T

he North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) was established in 1994 to enable
various industries to remain competitive in
the North American market and to increase
trilateral trade among Canada, Mexico, and the United
States. Since Donald Trump came into office as President
of the United States, there has been potential for reform
of NAFTA, and the impact needs to be examined (North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)). The impact
of NAFTA on the trucking industry is explored in this
study, as the majority of trilateral trade is conducted
by trucks crossing borders, which requires freedom of
transit.
President Trump intends to renegotiate trade
agreements, especially with Canada and Mexico.1
Through these negotiations, the United States seeks to
support higher-paying jobs in the United States and to
grow the U.S. economy by improving U.S. opportunities
to trade with Canada and Mexico (NAFTA). On the
other hand, “Mexico has asked the United States to
allow its trucks on U.S. roads, and [this] was promised
in the first NAFTA agreement but withdrawn by the
BRIDGEWATER STATE UNIVERSITY

U.S. Congress, so Mexico is also looking for an anticorruption clause” (Amadeo, 2018). Mexico and Canada
do not share the same concerns. Canada is looking for
the end of tariffs from the United States on products
such as lumber and dairy. Those areas would impact
trade and have a trickle effect on the trucking industry,
although changes are not likely since there has not been
much progress in the negotiation meetings (Amadeo,
2018). It has also been said “that upwards of 60% of
NAFTA trade is truck-based … so there is probably little
replacement for this trade coming from anywhere since
these are the U.S. land borders,” although rail would
be the second leading mode (US Trade Experts, 2017).
Taking into account all of this information, this research
explores which aspects of NAFTA would be affected
more than others in a renegotiation. This study uses a
strategic audit approach to make recommendations that
seek to keep trucking companies involved in trade and
with NAFTA.
Current Performance
According to the United States Department of
Transportation, as of May 2015, 31.4 million trucks
were registered and used for business purposes (“Reports,
Trends & Statistics,” 2015). Internationally, trucks
transported 58.3% of the value of trade between the
U.S. and Canada in 2015 and 70.9% of trade between
the U.S. and Mexico. The value of truck-transported

Editors’ note. This essay was written in early Spring 2018, months
before the October 2018 conclusion of negotiations resulting in
the United States-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement (USMCA), the
successor to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
This scholarship provides scholarly insight into the subject that was
available at that moment.
1
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trade increased 4.4% to $376.6 billion with Mexico.
With Canada, the value slipped 5.3% to $335.2 billion,
but there were also gross freight revenues of $726.4
billion (“Reports, Trends & Statistics,” 2015). In 2016,
NAFTA generated a lot of cross-border trade, which was
found to be worth $89 billion to the trucking industry
(Roberts, 2017). With revenues come expenses, and
taxes in 2014 included $39.9 billion paid by commercial
trucks in federal and state highway user taxes.
Employment performance in 2014 and 2015 included
7.3 million people employed in trucking-related jobs,
3.5 million of whom were truck drivers (“Reports,
Trends & Statistics,” 2015).
The purpose of the research was to investigate
NAFTA negotiations and what could result from them
for the trucking industry. Various methods were used,
including organizational and industry analyses and
Porter’s Five Forces. Porter’s Five Forces are the (a) threat
of new entrants, (b) rivalry among firms, (c) substitute
services, (d) bargaining power of buyers, and (e) power
of suppliers. Those forces are used to explore the fact
that “a corporation is most concerned with the intensity
of competition within its industry, [and] the level of
this intensity is determined by competitive forces, [and]
the collective strength of these forces determines the
ultimate profit potential in the industry” (Wheelen,
Hunger, Hoffman, & Bamford, 2015, 104). The
industry is scanned, and the corporation must assess the
importance to its success of the five forces. The stronger
the forces, the more limited companies become, but
weaker forces can become opportunities for companies
(Wheelen et al, 2015).
Threat of New Entrants
“New entrants to an industry typically bring to it new
capacity, a desire to gain market share, and potentially
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substantial resources” (Wheelen et al, 2015, 105). It is
not difficult to enter the industry when the barriers to
entry—or the “obstructions that make it difficult for a
company to enter an industry”—are low, but one must
keep in mind that trucking is a lifestyle with a large
initial investment and costs throughout. However, those
costs do not keep many away from trucking (Wheelen et
al, 2015, 105; Delco, 2015).
Rivalry Among Firms
There are roughly 500,000 trucking companies in
the US. The most obvious component of trucking
competition is within the US, as many companies are
capable of performing the same duties. Efficiency and
effectiveness are the determining factors. Small, medium,
and large trucking companies face similar issues, but
larger companies have an easier time executing their
duties and can exhaust more resources because there are
more opportunities to determine what works and what
does not (“Five Frequently Asked Questions,” 2010).
Substitute Service(s)
A substitute service is one that does not look like the
particular service in demand, but will satisfy in the
same way to fulfill the customer needs (Wheelan et al,
2015). There are not a lot of substitutes to trucking,
but rail and air services are often utilized in conjunction
with trucking. Companies use “truck and rail or truck
and air for ultimate delivery to the customer,” with rail
being slower and air being faster (“Competition Drives
Trucking Industry,” 1998; “International Shipping
Costs,” 2018).
Bargaining Power of Buyers
In most cases, buyers have the ability to affect an
industry because they have the power to change prices.
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Buyers force prices down when their demand decreases;
suppliers cannot sell their products otherwise. Buyers
can demand higher-quality products and more services.
They also can play the competitors against each other
(Wheelen et al, 2015). Buyers may be able to lower the
cost of shipping, especially when threatening to use
another product or supplier.
Power of Suppliers
Suppliers have more power than some would think,
and this power can affect the industry. Suppliers have
the power to raise prices and/or reduce the quality of
goods and services (Wheelen et al, 2015). Although
suppliers can technically raise prices, given the implied
number of suppliers in the trucking industry, this would
not be wise. If costs are passed on to consumers, there
is potential for the cost of shipping to increase. In that
case, the cost of the service rendered is likely to increase
as well. This would make for an unfortunate chain
reaction.
Methodology
This study is a synthesis of information found from
scanning and assessing the external environment of
the trucking industry, and it examines what a specific
company’s internal environment would be like. From
the facts presented in each analysis, recommendations
are made in order to address any issues going forward.
Both the external and internal factor analysis tables
below, which resemble a detailed S.W.O.T (strengths,
weaknesses, opportunities, threats) analysis, present
information about the trucking industry, which factor
into trucking organizations, and whether they are
helping or hindering the business. The tables give
a visual representation of each factor, which has a
weight and rating that are then multiplied to arrive
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at the weighted score. The weights are out of 1 (Most
Important) with 0 being the least; they give a rating
of the importance and level of impact of the factor
in regard to the company’s current and future success
(Wheelen et al, 2015). The rating is on a scale of 0 to 5
with 5 being the best in regard to how well the industry
or organization is responding to the factor(s). The
comments are the explanations of those factors (Wheelen
et al, 2015).
Industry Analysis
External opportunities and threats are used to study the
trucking industry and what is helping or hindering the
companies. When using this information, it is important
to determine what is helping and hindering by assigning
these factors to opportunities or threats respectively.
Based on the findings and calculations above,
it can be noted that the threats have a greater impact
than the opportunities. However, threats can be turned
into opportunities if done so properly. When thinking
of these external factors in a visual sense, one might
consider a metaphorical seesaw. Where there is an
opportunity for more jobs and increased revenue, there
is also the threatening potential that jobs could be lost
and revenue lost. This is because results of NAFTA
cannot be thoroughly predicted without weighing both
sides of every scenario. Furthermore, the proposed
changes to NAFTA are more likely to harm the US
agreement with Mexico than with Canada, so a threat
to Mexico can be deemed an opportunity for Canada.
The people working in the trucking industry are not the
only ones who have concerns; consumers are affected as
well because some goods and services are not important
enough to some consumers to keep paying increases in
prices. Even if consumers are able to pay, they may not
necessarily be content to do so. The factors presented
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Table 1: External Factors Analysis
External
Factors
Opportunities

Weight

Rating

Weighted
Score

Comments

Potential for
more jobs
Increased
revenue
Increase in
cross-border
trade
Help Canada &
Harm Mexico

.10

4

.4

.10

4.2

.42

If there are only NAFTA renegotiations, more jobs
could be added.
Not much change, only improvements.

.10

3

.3

400% increase since NAFTA was implemented,
potential for more growth.

.05

2.2

.11

Elimination of
some taxes
Threats

.05

2

.1

Issues with Mexican border would pose a threat to
drivers because they would not be able to cross the
border for trading, but Canada seems to still be able to
do so and to increase trade relations even more.
Potential for some taxes to be cut or eliminated which
might increase trade and need for trucks.

Loss of jobs

.15

3

.45

Loss of
revenues

.20

3.4

.68

More
regulations
Technology
Advancements

.10

4

.4

.05

4.8

.24

Customer
Relations

.10

3.5

.35

Total Scores

1.00

If there is less need for trade, there is less need for truck
drivers. If the industry is dwindling, they will have less
work.
Increase fees, loss of customers. Less sales, less use for
trucks, less revenue.
Increased tariffs harm the companies and the
consumers.
Some are able to shop elsewhere with increased internet
commerce.
Customers might not want to or be able to purchase
when prices increase. Could specifically harm Mexico
and avocado trading.

3.45

Source: Gillespie (2016), Lawder (2018), Roberts (2017); Schulz (2017), Ending (2018).
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here are important not only for the industry, but for any
consumer who knows that the products and services they
utilize would not exist without a proper trade agreement.
Reasons like these are why technology and customer
relations are important. The trucking industry does not
only need to worry about the agreement from a job and
revenue standpoint, but also with regard to the other
factors that affect the industry, such as technology and
customers, all of which have a bearing on jobs. NAFTA
may have been doing well these past few years with great
increases in trade, but that does not mean it will remain.
A lot of the external factors can and are likely to change,
and as can be seen in the table above, those changes can
either benefit or harm the industry.
Organizational Analysis
Internal strengths and weaknesses are used to study the
specific factors related to the trucking industry. Each
sector is determined to be a strength or weakness to
aid in the evaluation of what is helping or hindering
the company and why. Internal information makes it
easier to pinpoint room for change and problem areas.
Companies with the ability to exploit their resources
have greater capabilities. Those closer to the border
are likely to garner more business if their performance
has been positive. Companies that are able to provide
good client service and anticipate consequences,
while also demonstrating great risk management,
have excellent core competencies (White, 2016).
Competitive advantages include knowing how to
maximize the market and how to use good marketing
with clear objectives (White, 2016). It is easier for
larger companies than for an independent worker to
gain the resources and capabilities necessary to support
a competitive challenge. It is less challenging for more
experienced workers to handle customers, trucks, and
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orders because the knowledge is ingrained in them.
Synergy, or cooperation among those who work for the
company, those who run the company, and those who
are delivered to, is important because when companies
or organizations are able to work together well, processes
run more smoothly. Synergy is what keeps the trucking
industry going and growing (Wheelen et al, 2015).
The findings and calculations above suggest
that the strengths have a greater impact than the
weaknesses in the trucking industry. This is opposite to
the conclusion made concerning the opportunities and
threats. Strengths are something a company or industry
already possesses, while an opportunity is something it
do not necessarily have but can take proper advantage
of. The focus on the table above is clearly strengths and
weaknesses, and it is important to take note of the fact
that the industry has many strong points, but anything
can happen in this case because the negotiations are still
happening.
Since it is clear that Mexico is likely to be
harmed more than Canada, most of the weaknesses are
related to what could happen with Mexico. If Mexico
is out the agreement, NAFTA really is not the same
anymore. However, what Canada and the United
States do with it may still benefit them and would still
exemplify the strengths and weaknesses above. They may
be able to lessen their weaknesses and turn them into
strengths over time. There are many internal factors to
consider here and it is made clear from the data that
anything can happen. Nonetheless, if everything remains
the same, NAFTA could still be successful. If the
renegotiations lead to great change, then NAFTA could
fall apart, and these strengths would not be enough
to keep the industry going, and the weaknesses could
worsen.
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Table 2: Internal Factors Analysis
Internal
Factors

Weight

Rating

Weighted
Score

Comments

Access to
many border
zones

.05

3

.15

Not only operate near the border.

Experienced,
qualified, and
safe

.15

4

.6

Regulations put in place to ensure safety.

Highly
Integrated

.10

4.3

.43

Elements are properly coordinated, easier to meet
needs.

Country
relations
Movement of
goods is key

.10

3.5

.35

Trade relationship is good but could deteriorate soon.

.10

4.8

.48

One of the only options to move goods: promotes
economic success.

Mile
Restriction

.15

2

.3

Cannot go further than 20 mi from the border;
otherwise trucks do not meet US safety standards.

Highly
sensitive
Subject to
fallout

.15

3.5

.53

Sensitive to any disruption in industry.

.05

3.7

.19

If Mexico, loss of all relations and revenue. If Canada,
could suffer from the US-Mexico fallout. Mexico and
Canada are highly integrated.

Global
Positioning

.10

2.2

.22

Hard to cross border, let alone keep relations with
Canada if US leaves.

Not Internet
Based
Total Scores

.05

2

.1

Internet Commerce on the rise.

Strengths

Weaknesses

1.00

3.35

Source: Amadeo (2018), Roberts (2017), Yeung (2017).
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Results: Strategy Formulation
The focus here is to pinpoint the most important
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats in order
to explore the external and internal factor combination.
This aids in the selecting of the most promising strategies
in order to help the company. Strengths are used to
exploit opportunities in order to have the company gain
the best results. The Strategy Formulation Analysis table
below is used to provide a visual representation summary
of the most important factors from the internal and
external factor analysis tables. Each factor is specified as
a strength, weakness, opportunity, or threat once again,
but the rating for each factor remains the same, with
the weight being altered to make sure the total equals
1 (Wheelen et al, 2015). From this table strategies are
formulated in order to make recommendations for
dealing with any issues at hand. In this case, that would
be NAFTA renegotiations.
Strategies would include increasing the domestic
customer base in each respective country, which would
mean more coast-to-coast transportation in the US;
however, that would increase competition with rail
service. Such a change would favor trucking companies
that are able to adapt in business. Consumers would still
receive the goods they need; however, the US does not
produce as many goods as are consumed, meaning it
would cost more to acquire them. Although this strategy
has its positive aspects as expressed above, there are
setbacks as well. The setbacks would be a loss in revenue
to producers and less need for some trucking companies
by the border, especially the companies involved with
taking loads from Mexican trucks and transporting them
from the border.
A second strategy would be accepting the
changes and adapting when the proposed tariffs and
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taxes increase. If the border remains open, which is
likely, there will be constant trade, although there may
be a slight decrease. When costs increase, generally
the end consumer is impacted most. NAFTA is vital
to trucking, which could mean that revenues would
increase because of the increase in tariffs and taxes and
allow for job retainment. An example of how these
changes would affect consumers and the industry is the
sale of avocados, as they are grown in Mexico. It would
be harmful to both the US and Mexico if the trading of
avocados were made almost impossible. Avocados cannot
easily be grown in the US, yet there is a strong market
for them, meaning any increase in cost would not deter
many consumers, especially given the trend among
millennials of consuming avocado in various forms
whether, it be on toast or at Mexican restaurants.
Conclusion
The purpose of this research was to perform a strategic
audit and provide recommendations that the trucking
industry could utilize in regard to the changes
in NAFTA, whether the treaty is renegotiated or
eliminated. The major finding in regard to renegotiation
is that taxes and tariffs would likely increase; the
recommended course of action would be to take the
changes and adapt and keep a close eye on NAFTA
negotiations. Organizations within the trucking industry
must also create several contingencies. NAFTA will
most likely be kept in some shape or form. However,
the cost of shipping will be increased if tariffs and taxes
are increased, affecting consumers and causing difficult
issues for products in lower demand. Another way to
adapt to the changes without deterring the organization
too much would be to lobby Congress intensely. If the
trucking industry puts enough pressure on Congress,
they may not enact certain changes.
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Table 3: Strategy Formulation Analysis
Strategic Factors

Weight

Rating

Weighted
Score

Comments

Highly
Integrated
Movement of
goods is key

.10

4.3

.43

.10

4.8

.48

Elements are properly coordinated, easier to
meet needs.
One of the only options to move goods;
promotes economic success.

W1

Mile Restriction

.10

2

.2

W2

Highly sensitive

.15

3.5

.53

O1

Potential for
more jobs
Increased
revenue
Increase in crossborder trade

.10

4

.4

.10

4.2

.42

.10

3

.3

T1

Loss of jobs

.15

3

.45

T2

Loss of revenues

.10

3.4

.34

Total Scores

1.00

S3
S5

O2
O3

3.55

Cannot go further than 20 mi from the
border (MEX); otherwise trucks do not meet
US safety standards.
Sensitive to any disruption in industry.
If there are only renegotiations jobs could
increase.
Not much change, only improvements.
400% increase since NAFTA was
implemented, with potential for more
growth.
If there is less need for trade, there is less
need for truck drivers. If the industry is
dwindling, then they will have less work.
Increased fees leads to loss of customers.
Lower sales = less use for trucks and lower
revenue.

Source: Amadeo (2018), Roberts (2017), Schulz (2017).
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The companies that will be most impacted by
renegotiation or elimination of NAFTA are those that
specialize in cross-border trucking. This industry is
highly sensitive to change, and until a clearer picture
emerges of where renegotiation might go, companies
must be prepared for several alternatives: reduced
business, no business, or business as usual. Jobs will
be lost if the cost of shipping is too high because
eventually consumers will be unwilling to pay. The
potential changes to NAFTA are more likely to harm the
consumers than the industry, but trucking companies
cannot remain successful without customers. This is a
new era with President Trump in office, and a lot can
occur, particularly in regard to NAFTA. The research
presented here shows that essentially anything can
happen. That said, it looks like what will happen is not
too harmful for the trucking industry. It is important
to note the relevance and importance of any changes
because NAFTA has been in place since the 1990s and
trade is a major form of commerce.
Limitations
Given the short amount of time President Trump had
been in office at the time of this research, and given
that the talks about NAFTA are fairly new, there were
limitations to the research. They include a lack of
available data and lack of prior research on the topic.
Many of the information explored does not pertain to
the trucking industry specifically, or does not pertain
to NAFTA, both necessary for the case at hand. There
is not a lot of literature on the topic yet because the
renegotiations have only been occurring for a few
months. Although there are news articles and various
sources explaining what is happening, the topic is subject
to frequent changes.
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Renegotiating the Realm of
Influence:
The Shifting Priorities of
President Trump during
NAFTA Renegotiations
SANFORD JONES

T

he politics of the President of the United
States, Donald Trump, has oscillated between the outward expression of promoting
United States (US) economic prosperity and
an antagonistic populism that seeks to isolate him and
his followers from established political norms. This has
recently manifested in the interrelations between domestic influence and foreign policy. Acting upon a campaign
promise to enter into a renegotiation with Canada and
Mexico of the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), driven by a perception that this could
improve economic outcomes for the US, the Trump
Administration began to establish strategic objectives to
bring to the negotiating table. While the priorities stated
by the Administration displayed a moderate and sound
strategy in line with contemporary economists, a shift in
policy preference occurred once the renegotiation of the
agreement began. The Trump negotiating team moved
toward a decidedly more nationalist posture.
This article examines the factors that caused
that drastic shift in international trade policy. First,
it addresses the corporate interests that established
significant influence on the White House. Second, it
assesses the moderating influence on trade policy that
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followed from this corporate access. Third, it analyzes
the rationale behind the imbedded corporate interests
in trade policy and the importance of NAFTA to
influential American businesses. A contextual analysis
follows concerning the President’s comments about
the 2017 Charlottesville, Virginia protests and how
they affected corporate influence in the White House.
Next, this essay examines the effects of the dissolution
of access first granted to corporate interests, followed
by an analysis of populist nationalism and its impact
on the Administration’s trade negotiations. Finally, the
implications of these findings on US foreign policy and
international relations is considered.
Upon entering the Oval Office, President
Trump established economic advisory councils replete
with private-sector expertise. One such council, the
Strategic and Policy Forum, contained a multitude of
CEOs with the objective of advising the President “on
how government policy impacts economic growth,
job creation, and productivity” (Blackstone 2016).
Similarly, the President instituted a Manufacturing
Jobs Initiative, which sought input from CEOs on
government policy and regulations with the objective to
“promote job growth and get Americans back to work
again” (White House 2017b). Upon being appointed
chairman of the manufacturing council, Dow Chemical
CEO Andrew Liveris was optimistic that the Trump
Administration was “not going to do anything to harm
competitiveness” (quoted in Meyersohn 2017). While
ostensibly the councils were established to ensure that
economic policy aligned with the interests of American
businesses, their ability to increase job growth and
competitiveness hinged on access to the White House.
During preparations for the renegotiation of NAFTA,
the influence of business interests within the councils
seemed to deliver a moderating effect on the policy of
BRIDGEWATER STATE UNIVERSITY

the Trump Administration, which began by seeking
trade reforms consistent with internationalist economic
perspectives.
Before the Trump Administration began the
process of renegotiations with Canadian and Mexican
officials, it developed strategic approaches and objectives
for the international meetings. As NAFTA had not
been updated in the more than two decades, its
provisions were in need of adjustment, according to
many economists and scholars.1 The original negotiating
points set out by the Trump Administration seemed
to reflect this. There was a reluctance to simply reject
the agreement, as had been done with the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) (Irwin 2017, 45). In his report
to Congress, Robert Lighthizer (2017), the United
States Trade Representative (USTR) for the NAFTA
renegotiations, outlined a modernization strategy to
address digital trade, intellectual property, labor, and
environmental standards. These renegotiation policy
objectives were not a significant departure from those
that economic commentators had articulated over the
course of the agreement’s implementation; indeed,
the approach taken was notably similar to provisions
within the proposed TPP (Palmer, Behsudi, and Cassella
2017). This suggests that the business interests invited
to advise the White House on economic policy initially
established a significant influence on international trade
issues (Neal and Pascrell 2017). The congruence between
the initial renegotiation provisions, concerns of previous
US administrations and various expert opinions suggests

For recommended reforms to NAFTA see, for example, Hufbauer
and Schott (2005), Leblond and Fabian (2017), Schoen (1999), or
Smillie (2017).
1
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that Trump’s populist campaign rhetoric was initially
influenced by corporate interests. These interests were
afforded access to decision-makers through the Strategic
and Policy Forum and Manufacturing Jobs Initiative
advisory councils, which gave them an ability to impact
policy formulation.
The two advisory councils consisted primarily
of CEOs from the most profitable and influential
corporations in the US, and while their interests
differed on many policy issues, a significant number
of their members benefit from and support the notion
of a North American free-trade zone.2 Members
of the Strategic and Policy Forum involved with
manufacturing, such as General Motors (GM) and
General Electric (GE), have a preference for freetrade policies, especially within the North American
market. With a former CEO on the Strategic and Policy
Forum and the current CEO on the Manufacturing
Jobs Initiative council, GE has been a supportive
voice for NAFTA renegotiations as a modernization
attempt (Graham 2017). The position held by GE was
likely influential; its public positions on NAFTA were
consistent with the renegotiation objectives presented
in Lighthizer’s letter to Congress, which highlighted
the need for reforms in digital trade and intellectual

Among the members of the economic advisory councils are
financial and manufacturing firms that are involved in transnational
production in North America and have made statements in support
of NAFTA; others which neither benefit nor are disadvantaged
by international trade have mostly remained silent on the issue.
The major exception is labor. The AFL-CIO and the Alliance for
American Manufacturing, both represented on the Manufacturing
Jobs Initiative, have voiced concerns about lower wages and working
standards in Mexico and insufficient rules of origin to promote US
manufacturing, respectively (Trumka 2017; Paul 2017).
2
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property (General Electric Company 2017; Lighthizer
2017). Similarly, GM CEO and Strategic and Policy
Forum member Mary Barra was critical of intentions
to impose tariffs on continental trade (Gardner 2017).
Several investment and consulting firms involved in the
councils had produced reports noting the disruption
an abandonment of NAFTA would cause, while also
inferring the need to modernize the agreement (EY
2017; Wien 2017; Boston Consulting Group 2017).
During interviews in April of 2017, CEOs on the
Strategic and Policy Forum reported that the President
was actively listening to the councils and taking industry
advice into consideration when formulating policy
(Kelly 2017b). The diminished rhetoric threatening to
nullify NAFTA can be attributed to these corporate
interests (Kelly 2017a). However, as Hopkins (2007)
points out, the US experienced increasing stress between
the discourse of nationalist conservatism and assertive
corporate globalism, with an economy that has expanded
globally and a politics that remains decidedly local. The
“fear of foreign invaders, stirred up in the aftermath
of 9/11, called for the rebuilding of fortress America”
(Hopkins 2007, 109). This is the conflict within the
Trump strategy: at one end an economic need of global
integration and, at another, the local fear of losing a
moral and cultural identity.
Despite their initial influence in shaping
renegotiation objectives, the access afforded to members
of the advisory councils was eventually eliminated. The
decision to disband the councils was precipitated by
a majority of the councils’ members deciding to step
down after inflammatory remarks were made by the
President about the Charlottesville ‘Unite the Right’
protest, in which Trump “appeared to confer legitimacy
on white supremacists” (Olorunnipa, McCormick,
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and Niquette 2017).3 As the NAFTA negotiations
began just days after these events, an increasing shift
was apparent within the Administration, and it began
to talk about ending the agreement between the US,
Canada and Mexico.4 Lighthizer’s opening remarks at
the first round of negotiations in Washington indicated
that the more moderate tone in strategic objectives
had been abandoned: “[w]e believe that Nafta [sic] has
fundamentally failed many Americans and needs major
improvements” (quoted in Mauldin and Vieira 2017).
The increase in protectionist nationalism within the
White House created a chaotic point of uncertainty.
Trump repeatedly threatened to initiate the NAFTA
withdrawal mechanism through an executive order.
The Trump Administration moved farther from the
goal of modernizing the agreement, favored by the
business interests of the advisory councils, toward
populist propositions that were clearly unacceptable
to others at the negotiating table (Swanson 2017a).
This was especially evident in the novel suggestion by
Lighthizer that the renewed agreement should include a
US-specific content provision for manufactured goods

It is unclear whether opposition to the President’s remarks about
the Charlottesville protests, and the resignations that followed,
represent a moral issue or merely a cost-benefit analysis among
businesses anxious to distance themselves from the White House.
3

Whether the disbandment of the advisory councils was by order
from the President or by way of a consensus within the council is an
issue unrelated to the one discussed here; the distinction between
the two possibilities does not address the rationale behind the
action (Tracer, Williams, and Son 2017). To contend that Trump
had orchestrated the councils’ dissolution would be to confirm
a continuation of his populist rhetoric, while alleging that the
councils disbanded on their own accord would imply that the extent
of the damage caused by the President’s previous populist rhetoric
was enough to dissuade collaboration with more moderate business
interests.
4
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rather than the current one that applied to regional
content in general (Donnan, Nicolaou, and Webber
2017). Not only was this new negotiating position
a misrepresentation of the stated goals within the
Summary of Objectives for the NAFTA Renegotiation
(USTR 2017), it rejected the once-influential advisory
councils’ view that such a qualification “would greatly
complicate the ability of companies, particularly smalland medium-size enterprises, to take advantage of the
benefits of Nafta [sic]” (Matt Blunt quoted in Wall Street
Journal 2017). Now following nationalist objectives, the
President increased threats to withdraw if demands were
not agreed to by Canadian and Mexican counterparts
(Swanson 2017b).
In the face of an increasingly nationalistic policy
standpoint, the moderating influence of the advisory
councils was eliminated and the White House returned
to the principles on which Trump began his electoral
campaign. For him, trade was decidedly a zero-sum game
and disagreement among partners was cause enough
for an abandonment of alliances.5 This shift away from
the influence of business interests resonated in other
spheres. For example, Trump arrested plans to establish
economic councils on infrastructure (Beech and Burns
2017). The new protectionist approach focused only
on US production and reflected the limited effects of
business influence after the disbanding of the councils.
This seems to support a theory of opportunity in policy-

The implications of a NAFTA abandonment have been the subject
of increasing study and have been an area of analysis by various
firms and scholars. Influential reports include Cheney et al. (2017),
Gertz (2017), Globerman and Sands (2017), Johnson (2017),
Mosquet, Handschuh, and Wilson (2017), Murphy (2017), Parilla
and Muro (2017), and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (2017).
5
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making and influence: corporate influences could have
an impact on American foreign policy only insofar
as they have immediate access to the White House.
Business influence can be more strongly expressed when
institutions exist to support its advisory capacity. This
fits within Dahl’s (1998) plurality framework, which
sees these interests as part of a plurality that influences
policy through government access structures. When
these avenues of access break down, pluralism also
dwindles. While historically influential on government
policy, business interests have recently become limited
in their access to the Executive after the disbanding of
the advisory councils and thus have suffered diminishing
input in foreign economic policy (Pastor 1980, 45). This
diminished capacity to influence on the part of corporate
interest groups has resulted in a more radical nationalist
position taken by the Trump Administration toward the
renegotiation of the trade agreement.
This shift constitutes an exceptional circumstance
in American politics and the President’s populist
foundation for these actions is clear. The creation of
the Strategic and Policy Forum and the Manufacturing
Jobs Initiative was an ideological expression of freemarket liberalism, one generally embraced by the
Republican Party. But their destruction was the product
of radical populist nationalism. The electoral campaign
and subsequent presidency of Donald Trump took its
direction from a tradition of “Americans who have a
natural tendency… to take up positions of fear, hostility,
militancy, intransigence, and self-righteousness: in other
words nationalist positions” (Lieven 2012, 83). The
removal of business influence after Trump’s apparent
sympathizing with white supremacists exacerbated the
populist rhetoric of the White House, which now has
few moderating influences on its policy development.
The belligerent isolationism taken up by the
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Administration’s NAFTA negotiating team, which has
employed a strategy of repeatedly threatening to end the
Agreement, is the expression of a nationalist populism
free from the influence of economic elites.6 The formal
power structures within the Executive once contained a
regulated agonism between populist nationalism and the
interests of corporate elites; what Mouffe (2000) would
call the democratic paradox. But Trump’s demonization
of Washington elites has nullified that possibility.
Trump’s rise to power deployed the distinction between
an ‘us’ and ‘them’ struggling for hegemonic control; in
this case, a ‘people’s’ antagonism fighting for control
against a liberal globalist conspiracy. The nature of his
rise to power, therefore, made the continued existence
of an institutional agonism impossible (Žižek 2009,
277-81). The rhetoric the President employed, the
disbanding of the advisory councils, and the resulting
shift in renegotiation strategy have each been in line
with the populist hegemonic struggle for which Trump
was elected. A white, middle-class, nativist fear of
cultural loss, dispossession, or alien occupation has led
to the conspiratorial idea of a liberal dictatorship and
a hatred for its embodiment in economic elites as well
as ethnic and religious minorities (Lieven 2012, 85).
While the abandonment of the advisory councils may
have been a sign of return to original principles for some
of Trump’s radical nationalist supporters, it has severely
damaged the capacity of the NAFTA renegotiations
to obtain originally stated objectives, or real economic

Mearsheirmer and Walt (2007) exemplify this inequality of
influence in the case study The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy.
Moreover, Lindblom (1977) demonstrates the effect of wealth on
the degree of interest group influence on democratic government in
politics and markets.
6
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advancement in the United States.
Abandoning NAFTA would be incredibly
damaging to the US economy, though analysts differ
as to the immediacy of the impact and the degree
to which corporations in various sectors would be
affected by this scenario. It is clear, however, that the
foreign policy strategy of the Trump Administration,
left unmoderated by critical influences, is harmful
for American national interests internationally. The
official policy of the Administration is demonstrably
lacking in substance on key international issues, with no
mention of alliances or global challenges save its aim to
destroy “ISIS and other radical Islamic terror groups”
(White House 2017a). Within the Trump policy frame,
economic logic is abandoned for nationalist rhetoric.
Although the withdrawal from NAFTA is explicitly
offered as a solution within the America First Foreign
Policy (White House 2017a), it is seen in the frame of
benefitting manufacturers and American jobs which are
predominantly the beneficiaries of NAFTA and would
be likely much worse off within a nationalist economic
policy (Irwin 2017). The America First Foreign Policy
strategy in general, and the NAFTA renegotiations
in particular, have been negligent on the realities of
American interests and have simplified economic
problems to the point of illogical conclusions. Rather
than isolation from the international economy, job
growth in the US depends on stimulated domestic
demand and improving competitiveness in business.
While redressing ongoing trade disputes should be a
US foreign-policy objective, sacrificing international
relations with key allies by using belligerent rhetoric
and policy positions does nothing to improve economic
conditions and instead exemplifies a contempt for
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the American liberal-democratic principles that have
historically increased economic prosperity (Leffler 2017).
US foreign policy has traditionally accepted
a balanced approach to decision-making with an
acknowledged role in it for economic interests. This
has been undermined severely during the presidency
of Donald Trump. While it is clear that corporate
interests can exert significant influence on White
House policy, pluralism within the Executive can exist
only insofar as competing interests are given access to
decision-makers. The logic of this influence rests in the
benefits of democratic agonism within policymaking.
Given the Trump Administration’s goals of economic
advancement, these corporate interests represented a
source of business expertise, stakeholder consultation,
and moderation within the White House policymaking
mechanism. However, the populist antagonism displayed
by President Trump has eliminated the possibility of
moderation and endangered the renegotiation of the
trade agreement. In the absence of corporate influence
on the negotiations, a belligerent nationalist strategy has
developed in the US Administration that has exacerbated
the inherent difficulties of renegotiating NAFTA. The
policy shift made by the Trump Administration is
damaging not only to international relations but also
to national economic growth. There appears to be a
significant sacrifice of national interest for populist tenets
and it remains to be seen what further repercussions
this populist shift will have on both domestic and
international policy formation.
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The Klan Issue:
How French Canadians
Combatted Nativism
through 1920 Maine Local
Politics
ERIN BEST
In America’s Age of Trump, we must all consider
the long history of white nationalism. The 2016
presidential election paved the way for a resurgence
and more public appearance of this type of bigotry.
Often falling under the general use of the “Alt-Right,”
white nationalism became associated with Donald
Trump and his presidency through multiple avenues
and occasions. David Duke, a former Grand Wizard of
the Ku Klux Klan, endorsed Trump for president and,
later, his actions while in office, forcing the American
public to question Trump’s stance on racism and
white nationalism. Trump’s reluctance to denounce
immediately Duke’s support fired up the Alt-Right
base, while simultaneously inciting anger from many
Americans.1 The tipping point for most Americans
occurred with the Unite the Right rally, where both
white supremacists and white nationalists gathered in
Charlottesville, Virginia on August 11 and 12, 2017,
to protest the removal of a statue of Robert E. Lee.

Counter-protesters met the white nationalists, then
violence erupted and multiple injuries occurred. The
clash resulted in one woman’s death.2 On the day of the
rally, Trump did not condemn the white nationalists or
supremacist groups. Instead, he waited two days and
blamed both sides for the violence that had occurred.3
The Alt-Right did not take Trump’s comments seriously,
as the New York Times shows in their article, “Trump
Condemns Racists but Creates Fresh Uproar.”4 The
President’s ability to allow white nationalists to feel
comfortable and powerful in politics and society mirrors
a time in the United States’ history when organizations
such as the Ku Klux Klan felt that same level of comfort.
The 1920s offer a unique opportunity for
historians to explore the sources and influences of
organized race hatred. The 1920s represent a peak in
nativist rhetoric and policy in the United States and the
Ku Klux Klan reemerged as a key influencing factor in
this resurgence of hate. Unlike the Klan that held power
during the Reconstruction Era, the “New Klan” targeted
more than just African Americans; it also targeted
immigrants and Catholics, and anyone who did not
reflect what the Klan defined as “100 percent American,”
which it narrowly defined as Anglo-Saxon and
Protestant. While the core of the Klan’s base remained
in the Old South, it also gathered a large presence in the
Midwest and parts of the Southwest, in states such as
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Indiana and Oklahoma.5 The Klan also drifted north and
attempted to assert itself in New England politics during
the 1920s. In New England, its members publicly
opposed Irish Americans and Franco-Americans because
of their religious identities as Catholics.6 Specifically, in
Maine, the 1924 gubernatorial election brought the issue
to the front stage, particularly on matters of legislation
and denouncing the Klan. Within the context of local
politics, the Ku Klux Klan in Maine emerged as a largely
Anglo-Saxon, Protestant movement that sought to limit
the culture and lives of Franco-Americans, but the ability
of Franco-Americans to resist the attacks shows the
power of collective and mobilized opposition to hatred.
The 1920s symbolize the height of nativism in
the United States. After World War I, the United States
took on an isolationist agenda and sought to limit the
influx of immigrants into the country. Native-born
Americans, filled with racist ideologies, feared that
radical ideas, such as socialism and anarchism, would
enter the country via immigration. Nativism in the
1920s occupied only a minority of native-born American
ideology, but it effectively contributed to legislative
change. The 1924 quota system was a major legislative
victory for the nativist movement. An extension of the
1922 temporary war-time bill, the law set a cap on the
total number of immigrants entering the United States,
and specifically targeted “undesirable” immigrants from
southern and eastern Europe. The quota system utilized

Rory McVeigh, The Rise of the Ku Klux Klan: Right-Wing
Movements and National Politics, 26.

percentages, based on the 1890 census, mainly because
that census utilized fewer ethnic categories, which
limited the number of immigrants entering the country.
In 1890, a majority of immigrants entering the United
States came from northern and western Europe, while
a smaller number entered from eastern and southern
Europe. By using the 1890 “standard,” the United States
could encourage more immigration from the regions
they preferred. Immigration historians often note that
the quota system did not set a cap on North American
immigrants entering the country, but recognize that
this did not stop discrimination towards Canadians
or Mexicans.7 Yet, French Canadians still faced
discrimination when they migrated south. In Maine, the
Klan opposed Franco-Americans because they did not
represent its Anglo-Saxon, Protestant ideals.
Starting in the mid-nineteenth century, hundreds
of thousands of French Canadians migrated south to the
United States, more specifically to New England. They
emigrated out of Quebec due to lack of employment
opportunities, poor wages, and the crushing burden of
debt. Most French Canadians intended only to move
south temporarily. New England offered opportunities
for economic success, but when a recession hit the
American economy, these immigrants faced challenges
when attempting to return home.8 French Canadians
often came from rural areas, but the industrialization
of New England mills allowed them to enter the paid
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workforce easily, as mills sought low-skilled employees.
By the twentieth century, unable to return home due
to lack of finances, French Canadians settled all around
New England, with a high concentration of them in
Maine. Franco-Americans found success in the textile
industry and often sent their children to parochial
schools where they learned and practiced Catholicism,
which caused resentment among native-born Americans.
Throughout the 1920s, the Klan in Maine publicly
opposed Franco-Americans for their religious practices,
seeking to limit their culture and lifestyle through
legislation.
The 1924 gubernatorial election in Maine
showed the clear divide between supporters of the Ku
Klux Klan and those opposed to it. The Klan became
a powerful faction of the Republican Party in Maine
because of the party’s unwillingness to comment on the
Klan. While Maine’s election seemed to focus largely
on the denunciation of the Klan, the national discourse
was different. William Pattangall, the Democratic
nominee for the governorship of Maine, wanted the
national Democratic Party to oppose the Ku Klux Klan
collectively and publically to the same degree that he
did. The Republican nominee, Ralph Brewster, did
not publicly oppose or denounce the Klan. The 1924
New York Times article, “How Klan Figures in Maine
Election” gives insight on the different goals and values
that the nominees held, while attempting to determine

Mae M. Ngai, “The Architecture of Race in American
Immigration Law: A Reexamination of the Immigration Act of
1924,” The Journal of American History 86, no. 1 (1999) 70.
7

how the Klan’s power in Maine grew. The anonymous
journalist wrote, “The plan failed, for the convention,
despite Mr. Pattangall’s advocacy of an anti-Klan
platform declaration, refused to adopt it… The Maine
delegates returned home… without the endorsement of
their party.”9 If Pattangall had successfully secured his
party’s opposition to the Klan, it would have diluted the
Klan’s power not just in Maine, but across the whole
nation. The national Democratic Party’s unwillingness
to oppose the Klan officially shows the lack of unity
with the national party because of the Klan’s appeal to
Southern Democrats, while it also shows the support
that the Klan gained on a national level. Pattangall based
his campaign on an anti-Klan rhetoric, but he failed
to secure the governorship with this alone. The Klan
avoided being opposed outright by Democrats, which
allowed it to gain more power through Republican Party
and local government positions.
The 1924 gubernatorial election in Maine
showed the true influence of the Klan in local politics.
Many Maine residents aligned themselves with the
Klan’s interests during the gubernatorial election because
they represented an opposition to Irish Americans
and Franco-Americans. These residents felt that these
hyphenated Americans threatened the already struggling
Maine economy. Unlike in the South, where the Klan
largely allied itself with Democrats, the Klan in New
England often backed Republican candidates, and the
gubernatorial election in Maine did not differ from
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this regional characteristic. Prior to the election, the
Republican Party had dominated Maine public offices,
which reduced the necessity of the Klan’s support in
obtaining votes. Some sociologists have noted that the
Klan thrived in areas where it emerged as a solution to
local problems, while also being a moral support for
the dominant demographic. In the case of Maine, the
dominant demographic tended to be white, nativeborn, and Republican and this is where the Klan found
refuge.10 Even within this safe haven, the Klan’s mere
presence in the state forced many people to reconsider
their political allegiances, including Franco-Americans.
The 1924 New York Times article “How Klan Figures in
Maine Election” reported that “Heretofore the FrenchCanadians in those counties of this State in which they
are most numerous have generally voted the Republican
ticket, but on the anti-Klan issue raised by Mr.
Pattangall they may not do so this year.”11 The FrancoAmericans in Maine realigned their political affiliation
to the Democratic Party based on local Democratic
opposition to the Klan’s rhetoric. Although the national
Democratic Party did not support William Pattangall’s
opposition to the Klan, his position in Maine allowed
Franco-Americans to realign themselves accordingly.
While on a national level this shift did not make much
of an impact, Franco-Americans’ political adjustment
shows one way they attempted to defend themselves
from discrimination. This political realignment was
manifested when politicians began debate over an

10
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amendment to the Maine constitution to prohibit public
funds from being used in parochial schools.
Franco-American families often sent their
children to parochial schools to foster their culture,
language, and religion, but this only encouraged
opposition from the Klan. During the early twentieth
century, Franco-Americans felt conflict when deciding
whether to send their children to public schools or to
parochial schools. Public schools promised to assimilate
immigrant children more easily into American society,
but parochial schools allowed for these children to
keep their French language and their own culture
alive. In 1919, the Maine legislature passed a law that
prohibited the use of the French language in public
schools, which Franco-Americans deemed an attack on
their identity. This law also made parochial schools a
more appealing option. To draw more Franco-American
families to the parochial schools, some Catholic parishes
stopped charging tuition and instead covered school
costs through donations and by reorganizing their
finances to allow for more money to be used in their
schools. When this failed, parochial schools pushed on,
but politicians attempted to pass legislation limiting
their ability and influence throughout the 1910s and
1920s. Republican politicians and the Klan argued that
teaching foreign languages in parochial schools did
not promote an American national identity. Proposed
legislation appeared in all parts of New England. These
laws ranged in their aims, from completely eliminating
private schools to limiting the amount of time a foreign
language could be taught in a parochial school. In
Yves Roby’s 2004 book, The Franco-Americans of New
England: Dreams and Realities, he argues “That was why
the elite sought, by their own exemplary conduct, to
convince their fellow-citizens that the attachment to the
French language or to the Catholic religion in no way
41 • The Undergraduate Review • Special Issue • 2018

altered their devotion to the American Republic.”12 The
Ku Klux Klan believed that the unwillingness of FrancoAmericans to relinquish their French language came
from misplaced allegiances to the Catholic Church, but
in reality, their grip on their first language had more to
do with retaining their heritage. The debate on whether
public funds should be used in parochial schools became
an important matter in Maine’s 1924 gubernatorial
election.
The Klan opposed the parochial schools because
it felt that they prevented immigrants from assimilating
into American society and because of their Catholic
affiliations. During the 1920s, the Klan wanted to
promote Protestantism and “Americanism” at the
expense of Catholics. The 1924 election focused on
an amendment that would prohibit the use of public
funds in parochial schools. The influx of Catholic
immigrants to the United States caused many nativeborn Americans to fear the allegiances they brought and
their unwillingness to assimilate. The Klan became very
outspoken against parochial schools and argued that not
forcing Catholic immigrants to assimilate into American
society threatened the safety of the United States. Klan
members believed that immigrants’ traditions, religions,
and feelings of loyalty to their home countries could
not be compatible with life in the United States.13
Eugene Farnsworth, an organizer for the Klan, became
an outspoken champion of Protestantism and promoted
a “100 Percent American” national identity. In the
Lewiston Daily Sun’s 1923 article “Names of Local

Klan Agents Disclosed at Meeting in Auburn,” the
paper quotes Farnsworth promoting Klan attitudes.
Farnsworth reportedly stated, “If they are teaching
Americanism in Parochial schools they are false to Rome.
If they don’t they are false to America.”14 In other words,
Farnsworth claimed that a person could not be both a
Catholic and an American because one would cancel
out the other. He believed that Catholics would always
answer to the Pope before they would answer to the
United States government and based on that premise, he
believed Catholicism should not be supported directly
or indirectly by public funds in the United States.
Contrary to what the Klan believed, Franco-Americans
saw themselves as ideal immigrants, by moving to the
United States, by working in the industrial sector, and
by learning English. Franco-Americans believed these
principles contributed to the foundation of the United
States. How the Franco-Americans in Maine responded
to the Klan represents their ability to be their own agents
during a time when they faced discrimination.
While the rise of the Klan seemed imminent, the
mobilization of Franco-Americans and the difficulties
the Klan faced in the mid-1920s tells a different story.
In Maine, the Klan faced both internal divisions and
financial problems. Klan organizations in cities such
as Auburn and Lewiston, which had high Catholic
populations, faced internal divisions, which resulted in
the formation of rival factions. Furthermore, the arrival
of Edward Gayer, the new King Kleagle in Maine,
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prompted many Klan members to leave and follow
their former leader, Eugene Farnsworth.15 The Klan also
faced financial problems. The organization became the
target of many lawsuits and a rise in unemployment
within their membership meant fewer members paid
their dues regularly. To add to their financial difficulties,
at the end of 1924, a massive and expensive building
in Portland that the Klan had funded burned down. In
addition, The Klan had asked the city of Portland to
waive its property tax, claiming status as a religious and
educational organization, but the city denied it.
While the Klan dealt with these hardships,
Franco-Americans mobilized to defend themselves. Mark
Richard’s book, Not a Catholic Nation, describes the
Ku Klux Klan in New England during the 1920s and
one section of it focuses on the Klan in Maine. Richard
describes the awareness that Franco-Americans had
about their rights and their ability to become naturalized
citizens, allowing them to vote. Franco-Americans saw
their ability to vote in elections as their strongest tool
against the Klan. Richard describes the special election
held in Maine in 1926, after the death of a senator. The
Klan did not support the Republican Party’s nominee,
Arthur Gould. As a response, both Ralph Brewster,
the governor, and the Klan put their support behind
the Democratic nominee, Fulton Redman. FrancoAmericans, who formerly crossed party lines in the
1924 gubernatorial election, voting for the Democratic
nominee, used their voice to vote en masse for the
Republican nominee, in order to oppose the candidate
backed by the Klan.16 Gould’s overwhelming victory over
the Klan-backed nominee shows how Franco-Americans
acted as their own force to combat the discrimination

16

they faced. Although Franco-Americans may not
have been the deciding vote, their ability to oppose
collectively one nominee shows their desire to create a
change in their government. While the Klan seemed to
be an overwhelming force in Maine, the mobilization of
Franco-Americans against the Klan and Klan-supported
political figures shows the power that this minority
faction could wield.
The Ku Klux Klan emerged in Maine as a
group opposing Franco-Americans for their Catholic
identities, but the ability of Franco-Americans to act
as their own agents and protest the discrimination
shows their ability to overpower a vocal, hate-focused
minority. The Klan sought to limit the culture and
use of the French language by Franco-Americans on a
local level through state legislation. The Klan backed
politicians in the state who had the ability to pass the
type of legislation they wanted, such as the amendment
prohibiting public funds from being used in parochial
schools. While the Klan seemed to hold power over local
politics, Franco-Americans mobilized their numbers and
educated themselves on how to combat this opposition.
Franco-Americans in Maine became naturalized citizens,
enabling them to act and vote for the politicians who
best represented them. Often, in the 1920s, that meant
the politician not supported by the Klan. Their ability to
mobilize and vote to help enable change in local politics
can be used as an example today. In the divided Age
of Trump, where the Alt-Right and white nationalist
groups feel comfortable enough to publicly display their
own bigotry in mainstream politics, Franco-American
resistance to the power of hate through their political
action can be used as proof of the power of popular
politics to mitigate the power of hate in current politics.

Richard, Not a Catholic Nation, 52.
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Liquefied Natural Gas in
North America: An Analysis
of the United States’
Exportation Position in
the Context of its North
American Free Trade
Agreement Partners
SEAN CUNNINGHAM

L

iquefied natural gas is quickly emerging as a
dominant player in the global energy trade. As
more and more production terminals are built,
the potential for its use in replacing more
harmful fossil fuels grows. It has not only been touted
as an important step in the stalling of global climate
change, but also as a viable energy source for developing
economies in Asia and Africa. Increasing production
could effectively reduce the need for coal as an energy
source in several regions of the world. The United States
is at the forefront of the trade in this cryogenically stored
fuel, but there are restrictions to the material’s economic
prosperity. The U.S. imposes limits on those countries
with which it can trade liquefied natural gas, and
requires permitting and petitioning to allow countries
that do not meet their requirements to receive LNG
shipments. Still, the United States is in a better position
than its counterparts to the north and south when it
comes to the export of LNG. Its comparative advantage
rests in high volumes of surplus, a well-established
BRIDGEWATER STATE UNIVERSITY

infrastructure and a fairly compliant regulation system.
However, with continental, cross-border trading flows
dictating the crux of LNG trade for the three North
American partners, freezing each other out may result
in severe harm to U.S. export markets. The North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which has
been in effect for more than 20 years, has come under
fire.1 A main trade policy of the Trump Administration
has been to renegotiate the trilateral deal so that it better
benefits Americans. For the past several months, the
trade ministers from Canada, the United States and
Mexico have sat down to draft a new agreement, but the
United States has stated it will walk away from the table
if its demands are not met. This could spell disaster for
the U.S., which would no longer be able to send gas to
its primary importer, Mexico. The United States has the
possibility to expand its market, exporting gas to Europe,
Latin America and Southeast Asia. Unfortunately,
American regulatory statutes stand in the way of the
promotion of better opportunities for energy trade. The
U.S. should look to reduce these regulations not only
to benefit the economy, but to act as a failsafe should
negotiations fall through.
Liquefied Natural Gas Production
While most of the trade in natural gas occurs
through pipeline transport, liquefied natural gas (LNG)
is used to transport energy to and from regions that are
not suitable for pipelines to traverse. In order to convert
natural gas to its liquid form, it first must be extracted

Editors’ note: This essay was written in early Spring 2018, months
before the October 2018 conclusion of negotiations resulting in
the United States-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement (USMCA), the
successor to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
This scholarship provides scholarly insight into the subject that was
available at that moment.
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from the ground. This is done through a process known
as hydraulic fracturing, or fracking.2 Gas is naturally
found in pockets that are encased in large deposits of
shale deep underground. To remove the gas, a well is
drilled into the ground, and a mixture of sand, water
and chemicals are injected into a layer of shale. The rock
subsequently splits, releasing the gas and remaining
fluids, which are pumped to the surface. The blend is
then piped to a terminal, where it is purified. Carbon
dioxide, hydrogen sulfate and mercury, among other
impurities are removed from the product, and it is
cooled down to approximately -260°F. When condensed,
the gas is 1/600th the size of its original volume, allowing
greater quantities to be moved. LNG is then piped from
the terminal to a transport truck or vessel and shipped
to an import terminal where it is then stored, converted
back into its gaseous state, and distributed to consumers.
Investments in LNG are costly and time
consuming. It is estimated that more than 30% of the
cost of running an LNG terminal rests in construction
alone.3 One of the projects most recently approved,
the Driftwood Facility in Lake Charles, Louisiana, will
cost more than $15 billion dollars to build.4 This site
will be able to produce more than 27 million tons of
LNG annually and will have four individual terminals.

It is expected that initial LNG production will begin
in Lake Charles in 2022 and the complex will be fully
operational by 2025. Shipments of LNG can be trucked
across the continent, but they are more commonly
transported in large vessels overseas. The tanker ships
ferrying LNG are chartered five years before shipments
commence, and they cost more than $200 million to
build.5 Each ship is in service for approximately 35 years.
These massive investments are not common and require
a long-term commitment and market stability.
There are significant risks to the production
of LNG. If the frozen product is leaked and comes
into contact with water, it undergoes Rapid-Phase
Transition.6 This creates a massive explosion as the gas
expands. Additionally, LNG is extremely flammable.7
There are specific protocols in place on these transport
vessels, including those prohibiting the use of electronic
devices past the ship’s bridge. When wielded improperly,
LNG terminals and vessels could be commandeered for
acts of terrorism or coercion, causing national security
concerns. For a period following the September 11,
2001 attacks, LNG vessels were not allowed to enter
Boston’s Harbor for fear they would be turned into
floating bombs.8
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oxfordenergy.org/publications/lng-plant-cost-escalation/.
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“Rlng Spill and Rapid-Phase Transition,” KLAW LNG, https://
www.klawlng.com/lng-spill-and-rapid-phase-transition/.
6

“Consequence Assessment Methods for Incidents Involving
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Inc. (Federal Energy Regulatory Comission, 2014).
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The environmental benefits of LNG are also
subject to criticism. The energy source has been found
to burn 50-60% less carbon dioxide than coal, which
is a significant improvement when put into wide-scale
use.9 The methane leakage that is a byproduct of LNG
production, however, is cause for concern. Its output,
especially during transport, contributes to the increased
levels of heat-trapping gases in the atmosphere. The use
and exploitation of land that is required for fracking and
the transport of natural gas has caused concern over loss
of habitat, erosion, and aquatic pollution.10 The location
of these terminals and pipelines can cut right through
animal migratory paths, causing further confusion for
seasonal nomads. Additionally, significant negative
externalities arise with respect to renewable resource
production. While these resources are a cleaner source
of energy and therefore are more desirable in the long
term, they are also more expensive to produce and do
not have the same storage capacity as natural gas. Since
the price of LNG per output is cheaper, it is often seen
as undercutting the renewable resource market.
LNG in the United States
The history of the trade of liquefied natural gas
in America has not always been so lucrative. The United
States’ first import facility was constructed in the late
1930s.11 In 1944, there was an explosion at a terminal
“Cost and Performance Baseline for Fossil Energy Plants, Volume
1: Bituminous Coal and Natural Gas to Electricity “, ed. National
Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL) (United States Department
of Energy, 2010).
9

“Environmental Impacts of Natural Gas,” (2017), http://www.
ucsusa.org/clean-energy/coal-and-other-fossil-fuels/environmentalimpacts-of-natural-gas#references.
10

Michael L. O’Neill and Brian D. O’Neill, “U.S. LNG in the
Global Marketplace “ ABA Infrastructure and Regulated Industries
Section 53, no. 4 (2014).
11
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in Cleveland, when LNG leaked and then ignited. One
hundred and thirty people were killed as a result of the
disaster, and the construction of additional terminals in
the country was delayed for more than a decade. The
first export of LNG was sent to England from the Gulf
of Mexico in 1959.12 In the 1960s, there was discovery
of natural gas deposits in Algeria, and terminals were
constructed there to supply an energy-starved Europe.
During this period, the United States began to export
small amounts of LNG to Japan. By the 1970s, the
U.S. had constructed four import terminals in Texas
and Massachusetts. These terminals remained largely
unused through the 1980s and 1990s because there was
a decline in the need for natural gas. By the 2000s, the
LNG trade had resumed and there was a desire for rapid
increase of import facilities. As these facilities were being
constructed, however, enormous amounts of natural gas
deposits were discovered beneath U.S. soil. This led to
an about-face, as investors began pouring money into
their facilities to convert them to export terminals and
scrambled to build storage facilities to store the surplus
natural gas. It took time to convert these facilities, and
the mass exportation of LNG did not begin until 2016.
As of December 2016, the Energy Institute of
America (EIA) webpage estimates that the United States
has more than 200 trillion cubic feet of known natural
gas resources buried in shale deposits, and more than
600 trillion cubic feet that have yet to be proven.13 In

Sydney Weathersby, “A Deep Dive into Liquefied Natural Gas
(“LNG”): Is Lng a Clean Enough and Positive Energy Source for
Globalized Trade or a Port Nuisance?,” in ValpoScholar Valparaiso
University (Valparaiso University Law Review, 2016).
12

“Natural Gas Explained - Where Our Natural Gas Comes From,”
U.S. Energy Information Administration, https://www.eia.gov/
energyexplained/index.cfm?page=natural_gas_where.
13
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2016, the United States was estimated to have used
27.49 trillion cubic feet of natural gas domestically, two
thirds of which was used for electricity and industrial
sectors and 88 billion cubic feet of which had been
imported. The United States receives LNG from chiefly
Trinidad and Tobago, however small shipments also
make their way into the country via Norway and some
is piped in from Canada.14 The EIA estimates that the
United States exported more than 180 billion cubic feet
of LNG in 2016. Currently, the United States has only
two operational export terminals. According to the U.S.
Federal Energy Regulation Commission (FERC), the
Cheniere/Sabine Pass terminal processes 2.1 billion cubic
feet per day of liquefied natural gas.15 As of August 28,
2017, there were 11 project applications pending with
FERC.16 These projects exist primarily in the Gulf of
Mexico and there is one planned for Alaska. The EIA
estimates the U.S. is projected to overtake Qatar as the
world’s second largest producer of LNG, falling just
behind Australia by the year 2023.17

FERC to make the agency responsible for the siting,
permitting, construction and operation of terminals.18
The agency oversees 24 facilities, but many more are
being proposed and in the process of being approved.
There are state and local regulations that determine the
existence of some terminals, however these parameters
do not generally interfere with those of the federal
government. Additionally, FERC is responsible for
creating environmental assessments and impact
statements for LNG proposals. These papers include the
water and resource studies, effects on wildlife, as well
as public commentary. Additionally, the Department
of Energy employs the Office of Fossil Energy for the
approval of any importing or exporting of natural gas.19
As laid out in the Energy Policy Act of 1992:
the importation of the natural gas referred
to in subsection (b), or the exportation of
natural gas to a nation with which there is
in effect a free trade agreement requiring
national treatment for trade in natural gas,
shall be deemed to be consistent with the
public interest, and applications for such
importation or exportation shall be granted
without modification or delay.20

The United States government employs several
agencies to deal with the regulation of LNG imports
and exports. In 2005, the Energy Policy Act expanded

“Natural Gas Explained - Liquefied Natural Gas,” U.S. Energy
Information Administration, https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/
index.cfm?page=natural_gas_lng.
14

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “North American LNG
Import/Export Terminals - Existing,” (U.S. Department of Energy,
2017).
15

“North American LNG Export Terminals - Proposed,” (U.S.
Department of Energy, 2017).

National treatment prevents discrimination favoring
domestic companies when foreign competitors are
allowed in, and it allows foreign enterprises to be treated
like domestic companies. This also means that the
Office of Fossil Energy has the authority to unilaterally

16
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Exporter by End-2022: IEA,” Reuters (2017), https://www.reuters.
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block any trade of LNG that is not deemed to be in
the public interest. It is entirely at the discretion of the
Department of Energy to determine what does and
does not constitute public interest. There are various
other agencies that are required to oversee aspects of the
industry. The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency
and the Department of Transportation are all responsible
for more specific areas of regulation. The Coast Guard
is responsible for protecting offshore LNG terminals
as well as the vessels that transport the gas through
American waters. They require specific guidelines for
ships and facilities to follow to prevent unnecessary
disaster.
The expansion of LNG has been criticized by
some groups, mainly the Industrial Energy Consumers
of America (IECA). In August 2017, it sent a letter to
the U.S. Secretary of Energy, Rick Perry, urging the
government to cease all natural gas trade with countries
that do not have a Free Trade Agreement with the
United States. The letter claims: “The net effect is that
LNG exports, specifically to [non-FTA] countries lowers
our competitors’ costs and increases ours, directly and
negatively impacting competitiveness and our ability to
justify reshoring.”21
The letter also cites an EIA report that shows the
approvals for exporting LNG reached 71.2%
of the natural gas demand for the United States
in 2016. The letter then lays out two scenarios
in which most of the natural gas reserves in the
country will be consumed by 2050, using these
to justify their proposed moratorium. They

believe that if the demand for gas grows as the
supply diminishes, then consumer prices - both
domestic and abroad - will continue to grow. The
industrial sector is the second biggest consumer
of natural gas domestically. This also plays into
the Trump Administration’s narrative, “Buy
American,” and its general skepticism of foreign
trade.
What the IECA fails to acknowledge is the potential
for increased prices at home, should the United
States restrict energy flows. If the United States offers
only LNG to FTA countries, the price will initially
decrease. But as more of those countries become
more heavily reliant on the importation of LNG as a
cheaper alternative to harmful coal and oil emissions,
then demand will continue to grow and the issue of
price hikes for domestic consumers will reemerge.
Furthermore the U.S. is not required to grant national
treatment to foreign firms entering the country or
purchasing gas from nations who do not have FTA
status. This means that America can purposely keep
prices higher for non-FTA countries as they import to
offset the cost to domestic firms.
The Trump Administration should welcome
the increased export of LNG to FTA and non-FTA
countries alike. The owner of a newly authorized LNG
factory in Louisiana has been a high-profile campaign
donor to Energy Secretary Perry as well as being his
former employer.22 Ties like these to large petroleum
companies could hasten the authorization of LNG

Luke Bassett, “Rick Perry’s Dirty Industry Donors and
What They Could Mean for the Department of Energy,” 19
January 2017, https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/
news/2017/01/19/296807/rick-perrys-dirty-industry-donors-andwhat-they-could-mean-for-the-department-of-energy/.
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permits. Secretary of Commerce, Wilbur Ross, brokered
a deal with the Chinese that will lead to larger amounts
of LNG being exported from the United States and this
is essential.23 Unfortunately, as the supply of natural
gas has becomes greater, there is a lack of motivation
to build new terminals. The capital has dried up
because the price of the good is going down yet the
costs of building facilities are also decreasing. If the
U.S. can complete this deal, it is likely that an influx of
investment from the Chinese will emerge as they look
to meet their growing demand for energy. The former
head of the Office of Fossil Energy, Christopher Smith
refuted the idea that the Administration can accrue
such an investment, claiming that it will have to be the
private sector, not the government that will need to be
responsible for luring in investors. Additionally, Trump
has been heard touting the return of the coal and nuclear
power industries. This has caused some LNG companies
to feel excluded. As the CEO of Canary LLC, Dan
Eberhart, put it in an E&E News article, “Honestly, I
think it’s very narrow for them to be so focused on coal.
Either energy - or political-wise, it doesn’t make a lot
of sense to me. Not all of these policies seem to work
in concert together. [Trump’s] trade policies step on
American energy dominance.”24

direct violation of existing trade agreements.25 Under
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
special discretion is given to countries that restrict
their exports of natural resources for fear of depleting
their supply, however because of the consistent supply
of LNG being exported to countries with which the
United States engages in free trade, the exemption is no
longer valid. The GATT requires that all non-military
goods be freely exported to member countries. There is a
similar stipulation from the World Trade Organization.
There are a series of successful WTO cases that have
been levied against China over its restrictions on similar
materials, some of which include the United States as
a complainant. Additionally, during the past several
sessions of Congress, senators have put forth bills that
seek to expand the market for LNG. Previous bills have
received bipartisan support and were aimed primarily
at allowing exports to Japan and NATO allies without
modifications or delayed approval; but none were passed.
Most recently, Senators Bill Cassidy (R-LA) and Marco
Rubio (R-FL) introduced a bill that would allow the
transactions of small shipments of LNG to all countries
immediately upon receipt of application.26 Both Florida
and Louisiana would stand to see substantial gains from
the increased export of natural gas.

Other advocates of LNG expansion include the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce. It argues that restrictions
on the export of LNG to non-FTA countries are in

25
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26
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Canadian LNG
In recent years, there have been a number of LNG
projects proposed in Canada, and significant
investments have been made in their planning and
approval. Despite this, Canada has yet to emerge as
an active participant in the increasingly competitive
global LNG market, but proponents are still actively
working on projects on both coasts.

permits lasting anywhere from 20 to 40 years. Few have
broken ground.31

The Canadian Government’s National Energy
Board is responsible for the review of applications
for export permits. No countries are institutionally
restricted from receiving LNG imports. The permits
exist primarily to track the amount of LNG leaving the
country, and to monitor the domestic supply to make
sure there is enough to sustain Canada’s energy needs.
– Shelly Milutinovic, Chief
Additionally, jurisdictions vary for pipelines. Pipelines
Economist, National Energy Board27
that run solely within a province are regulated by that
The trade in liquefied natural gas in Canada is stagnant
provincial government, whereas interprovincial pipelines
at best. Canada has a significant surplus of the energy
are regulated by the Federal government. Both the
source, but its traditional export partner, the United
Federal and provincial governments are required to do
States, is replacing its imports with domestic production. environmental assessments on proposed projects. The
Canada has more than one trillion cubic feet of natural
overlap of the two competing spheres of government
gas in shale deposits in British Columbia and Alberta
can discourage investment and draw out the application
28
alone. Currently, only one LNG plant is in operation,
process. Given that constructing a terminal is time
29
an import terminal located in New Brunswick.
consuming, administrative delays can destroy working
This terminal, Canaport LNG, is responsible for the
deals.
production of more than 1 billion cubic feet of gas per
In July 2017, British Columbia lost a $36 billion
day.30 As of September 2017, 23 LNG terminal projects
deal with the Malaysian energy company, Petronas,
with export licenses had been proposed, with exporting
with the government citing global economic issues.32
In actuality, a series of governmental blunders sank
the otherwise lucrative deal. The previous provincial
27
“Canada a ‘Late Entrant’ to Global Liquefied Natural Gas
Market, Says New Neb Report,” Government of Canada, https://
government had sluggishly negotiated with Petronas, due
www.canada.ca/en/national-energy-board/news/2017/07/canada_a_
to a bevy of lawsuits by activists. When the provincial
late_entranttogloballiquefiednaturalgasmarketsaysnewneb.html.
election of summer 2017, soon-to-be Premier John
28
“Canada’s Role in the Global LNG Market – Energy Market
Horgan had campaigned fiercely against the deal.
Assessment,” Government of Canada, http://www.neb-one.gc.ca/
nrg/sttstc/ntrlgs/rprt/2017lngmrkt/cndslnglndscp-eng.html.
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31
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“Canadian LNG Projects,” Government of Canada, http://www.
nrcan.gc.ca/energy/natural-gas/5683.
Caludia Cattaneo, “‘A Tragedy for Canada’: Petronas Cancels
$36b Lng Project as B.C. Jacks up Demands,” Financial Post, 26
July 2017.
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If elected, he promised to negotiate new terms, and
potentially move the site of the project. Horgan’s
government then increased its demands in a new
negotiation process. It wanted additional compensation
for the resources being taken from the land, as well
as increased incentives for affected First Nations. The
stipulations caused Petronas to walk away from the
negotiating table. This was not the only proposal
that was canceled. There are six deals that have fallen
through, each of which is listed on the government’s
website.33 Complex regulatory frameworks severely
reduce the ability of Canadians to install LNG terminals
for exportation, which reduces their overall competitive
advantage.
LNG in Mexico
The energy infrastructure of Mexico is
crumbling. Its inefficiencies have led to production
decline across several industries within the energy
sector.34 Reforms have been slow and ineffective,
causing the government to open the country to foreign
companies, changing decades of precedent.
In 2013, the Mexican government amended
its constitution so that private investment could take
place in energy. The state-owned oil company, Petróleos
Mexicanos (PEMEX), along with the Comisión
Federal de Electricidad (CFE), the state-owned electric
company, would no longer have a monopoly on energy

33

“Canadian LNG Projects.”
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in Mexico.35 Conditions immediately following the
reforms did not incentivize investment and low prices
made foreign companies’ importations unprofitable.
There were internal tensions between PEMEX and
CFE, which led to concerns over fair competition and
stability within the region. Then, there was an uptick in
investment, particularly from American companies, as
surpluses of U.S. natural gas began to flow into Mexico
rapidly. Mexico currently has three import terminals,
receiving approximately 2.2 billion cubic feet of natural
gas per day.36 Between February 2016 and March 2017,
90 shipments of LNG were exported by the United
States, 18 of which were sent to Mexico.37 This makes at
least 55% of Mexico’s energy supply dependent on the
importation of U.S. energy.
There are concerns looking ahead to the Mexican
presidential election in 2018. Frontrunner, Andrés
Manuel López Obrador, has been a staunch supporter
of rolling back the energy reforms that have taken place
in recent years.38 This has been particularly worrisome
to investors, who need certainty to partake in such lofty
and time-sensitive investments. Existing investment
commitments are also on the rise, with the Mexican
Energy Secretary citing $49 billion committed to drilling
and exploration since 2015, a majority of which is
Havilands Sheldahl-Thomason and Richard H.K. Vietor,
“Mexico’s Energy Reform,” Harvard Business School (2017).
35
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36
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37
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American.39 ExxonMobil is committing $300 million to
distribution to Mexico over the next 10 years. Obrador
has softened his stance, but is still calling for an increase
in the development of domestic energy production.
He wants to focus on reviving gasoline refineries to
reduce the dependence on U.S. imports, but this may
be problematic as they are all more than 35 years old
and not profitable. Should Obrador win the election,
there will be a considerable reevaluation of the contracts
signed under previous president Enrique Peña Nieto to
determine if they are in the “best interest of Mexico,”
which creates caution among investors in the region.40
A NAFTA Withdrawal
President Trump has indicated that the United
States could withdraw from NAFTA should the
negotiation process fail to secure significant American
benefits. The exit process would take approximately six
months to go into effect.41 This has ramifications across
the board, but specifically for liquefied natural gas.
The United States would no longer have a Free Trade
Agreement with Mexico, and with Canada, the U.S.
would fall back on the FTA signed in 1987. This would
halt LNG exports to Mexico entirely, the chief importer
of U.S. natural gas. Additionally, tariff rates would rise to
the levels established under the WTO. This would mean
tariffs that were generally 0 percent on almost all goods
traded among the three countries could hit an average of

“Build Pipelines, Not Walls; Nafta and Energy,” The Economist
(2017).
39
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more than 7 percent in Mexico, 3 percent in the United
States and 4 percent in Canada. There is no guarantee
that, should the U.S. withdraw, the other two nations
would be willing to return to negotiations, which could
open the door for increased Canadian exports to Mexico
as they build their LNG infrastructure to circumvent
American isolationism. Increased tariffs could potentially
reduce the demand for imported energy goods and
increase the focus on self-sustainability, particularly in
Mexico, reverting it back to an inefficient and archaic
state-run system. It could also undercut the ability to use
LNG to replace more harmful but cheaper fossil fuels,
increasing the carbon dioxide output.
Conclusion
The United States has an opportunity to
be an even bigger player in the trade of liquefied
natural gas. As the world looks to develop, it
must also be sustainable. That means pushing
aside more old-fashioned forms of energy and
focusing on those that are more affordable and
widely accessible. Latin America, the Caribbean,
and other developing regions of the world are
increasing their demand for natural gas and
the U.S. has the comparative advantage. With
the largest shale gas deposit on the continent,
the supply is enormous. The United States has
significant infrastructure in LNG production
already in place. This means stability to investors
and companies looking to support projects. It
also means the potential expansion of existing
facilities to meet demands necessary for global
output. Conversely, Canada lacks significant
infrastructure to be a leading global exporter of
LNG, but it has a significant surplus to export.
While there is little restriction on shipping to
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most countries by the Government of Canada,
the lack of facilities to support exportation
means the United States has the ability to tap
the market first, provided it can reduce its
regulatory obstacles. The potential investment
deal the United States has struck with China all
but guarantees an inflow of capital for growing
LNG exports, which Canada does not have.
Mexico has no competitive advantage with
either country. Its exportation infrastructure
for LNG is non-existent and there is no known
surplus of natural gas to export. If Mexico can
tap into its reserves, the best it can do is convert
energy production to domestic consumption
and decrease its reliance on foreign imports of
LNG. North America, through NAFTA and the
rise of American natural gas production, is on
track to become energy independent by 2020.
This will allow the three countries to rely less on
producers like the unstable Persian Gulf states
and Venezuela. It drives costs down and creates a
consistent supply of sustainable energy.

partially by ensuring a consistent domestic
supply no matter what the desired output may
be, similar to the way the trade is handled in
Canada. Additionally, those nations that lack free
trade agreements with the U.S., once granted
LNG exportation and importation privileges,
would not necessarily have access to national
treatment. This means the United States has the
ability to inflate prices abroad to ensure there is
no advantage given to foreign firms, promoting
competition across various sectors. The United
States has the capacity to be a sustainable energy
provider to a larger section of the world. For
the U.S. to ascend to the position of world’s
leading producer of liquefied natural gas, it is
necessary to invest more heavily and publically
in the infrastructure allowing exportation of the
product on mass scales, and to expand the scope
of export markets. This is vital to the stability
and prosperity of the energy sector the economy.

Whether or not the United States
withdraws from NAFTA, it needs to relax
the standards of trade in LNG. Barring grave
concerns over national security, trade with
non-FTA countries should be a priority for the
Office of Fossil Energy. Not only is it a fail-safe
against the potential loss of large export markets
should the U.S. renege on trade deals, but it also
provides sustainable development to countries
who need energy infrastructure to progress.
It incentivizes nations to ditch coal-burning
energy production in the developing world,
which should lead to cleaner development. The
fears of large energy consumers can be curbed
54 • The Undergraduate Review • Special Issue • 2018
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The End of NAFTA and
a Future for Companies
in the Medical Device
Industry
MELISSA GUIMOND and JENNIFER KROUSE,
with KYLE BEAUREGARD

I

n 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) created one of the world’s largest free
trade zones and established the foundation for
economic growth and increased prosperity for
Canada, the United States, and Mexico. This essay sets
out to examine how proposed changes to NAFTA could
affect the Medical Device Industry.1 In recent weeks,
U.S. President Donald Trump has threatened to scrap
NAFTA or limit the number of economic sectors that
“free trade” with Canada and Mexico could encompass.
Were this to happen, the medical device industry
could be impacted in both positive and negative ways.
These possible changes create positive impacts for both
Canada and Mexico. Most of the possibly negative
changes directly impact the United States. Our research
analyzes external environmental factors and the industry
as a whole. We look at how the proposed changes
could affect three major companies operating in the
NAFTA region: GE Healthcare, Johnson & Johnson,

Editors’ note. This essay was written in early Spring 2018, months
before the October 2018 conclusion of negotiations resulting in
the United States-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement (USMCA), the
successor to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
This scholarship provides scholarly insight into the subject that was
available at that moment.
1
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and Medtronic. Through our research, we are able to
generate potential strategies for each of these companies
should the possible changes to NAFTA occur.
While studying the impact of the potential
changes of NAFTA in regard to the Medical Device
Industry, we first need to learn about how the industry
is currently doing and how potential changes proposed
could affect the industry. Our research of the Medical
Device Industry uses a strategic audit approach to
analyze and make recommendations to the top three
companies in the NAFTA region. Were NAFTA to
be scrapped or severely limited, there are a number of
likely impacts on the Medical Device Industry in the
United States. First, Mexico and Canada could retaliate
by imposing restrictions on United States products
that currently have favorable trade terms and high sales
volume. Second, there is the potential for a lower trade
deficit between Mexico and Canada. Third, scrapping
NAFTA might bring about an end to the Value-added
Tax (VAT). The VAT is a type of general consumption
tax that is added incrementally throughout each stage
of production or distribution. This would increase
profit margins for many companies, including those in
medical device production. Lastly, there could be more
complications involved when American-owned factories
stationed in Mexico are moved back to the United States
(Varney, 2017).
Context
Our research includes an assessment of the industry as a
whole within the NAFTA countries, its top sectors, top
trends, and the current performance of GE Healthcare,
Johnson & Johnson and Medtronic. We also use
Porter’s Five Forces, a tool to analyze the competition
of businesses, to assess the Medical Device Industry. It
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Figure 1: Basic Facts about Healthcare in NAFTA’s Three Countries
Canada

Mexico

United States

Population

35,099,836

121,736,809

321,368,864

Total Healthcare
Spending

$186 Billion

$82 Billion

$3 Trillion

Healthcare expenditures
total (% of GDP)

10.4%

6.3%

17.1%

Healthcare expenditures
per capita

$5,292 USD

$677 USD

$9,403 USD

Expenditures on
healthcare

Gov’t 71%,
Private 29%

Gov’t 52%, Private 48%

Gov’t 48%,
Private 52%

Size of medical device
market

$6.2 Billion
USD

$5 Billion USD

$147.7 Billion
USD

is a five-force model that determines the competitive
intensity or attractiveness of a company in regard to
its profitability. Figure 1 details some basic facts about
the medical device industry within Canada, Mexico
and the United States. The US dollar is very strong
and constitutes one of the reasons why the medical
device market is on the rise. However, the strong dollar
creates challenges for American device manufacturers
exporting to markets with weaker currencies (Corpart,
2018). Comparing the NAFTA countries gives a deeper
understanding of how each country values healthcare
and the medical device industry.
The Frost & Sullivan website provides a complete
2017 snapshot of the Medical Device Industry.
According to it, the top five sectors of 2017 were:
structural heart, robotics and robot assistance, neurodevices, integrated patient monitoring devices, and
diabetes care. Some of the top technology trends relate
BRIDGEWATER STATE UNIVERSITY

directly to the top sectors, such as the revolution of
diabetes care, surgical robots, and devices that connect
cars and trucks with health sensors. Health sensors
placed on the steering wheels of cars can detect heart
attacks, seizures and other health conditions that could
happen while driving (though this device is still in the
early development stage). With innovation in medical
devices, though, there are always some unexpected issues
that occur. In 2017, some of the concerns raised by
innovation in the medical device industry included those
concerning a restrictive regulatory environment, the
speed of technology, the ability to raise capital to fund
innovations and the changes in customer behavior and
demands. The medical industry is constantly changing
and it is extremely difficult to make sure that products
and devices are reliable. In 2017, there was also a
transformation in the medical device industry ecosystem.
Companies in this sector developed a connected
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ecosystem of sensors and devices that are readily available
to individuals and that serve the functions of identifying,
capturing and measuring health data, stratifying risks,
informing patients of conditions, and helping them and
their physicians to make decisions and take action. These
sensors and devices can be placed on an individual’s
body, in their homes, in community centers, in clinics
and, of course, in hospitals (Frost & Sullivan, 2017).
These sensors are extremely important for innovation
for consumers, such as those with diabetes, who use
them multiple times a day to check blood sugar levels.
The medical device industry is constantly changing
and evolving with new technologies. These changes can
be seen in the current performances of the companies
Medtronic, Johnson & Johnson, and GE Healthcare.
Medtronic
Medtronic is a Global Healthcare and Medical
Device company located in Mansfield, Massachusetts.
Medtronic’s mission statement claims that its first
priority is “to contribute to human welfare by
application of biomedical engineering in the research,
design, manufacture, and sale of instruments or
appliances that alleviate pain, restore health, and extend
life” (Medtronic). Medtronic is growing innovation in
the area of biomedical engineering. In 2017, it invested
more than $2 Billion in research and development,
which represented 7.4% of the company’s net sales that
year. Medtronic also launched labs to bring about new
initiatives to deliver financially sustainable businesses
that expand access and reduce health inequality in
emerging countries (Vivanco, 2017). Medtronic was
a very charitable company in 2017. It donated more
than $101 million to charitable causes in corporate cash
contributions given through the Medtronic Foundation,
in product donations and through employee
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volunteering. The four main product and service
focuses of Medtronic are cardiac and vascular afflictions,
restorative therapies, diabetes, and minimally invasive
therapies.
Johnson & Johnson
Johnson & Johnson is the world’s largest independent
biotech company with a market cap of $343.8 Billion.
A manufacturer of medical devices, pharmaceutical
and consumer packaged goods, it is an American
multinational company that was founded in 1886, with
its headquarters in New Brunswick, New Jersey. In the
third quarter of 2017, Johnson & Johnson’s revenue in
its medical device section was a little more than $19,650
Million. In Johnson & Johnson’s medical device section,
the main products they focus on involve general surgery,
energy science, endocutters, biosurgery, infection
prevention and wound closure. Medical device sales
account for 35% of the company’s value. As a company
that has been around for more than 100 years, Johnson
& Johnson has been and will continue to be a leader of
innovation in the medical field. By 2024, the company’s
forecasting predicts that its revenue will be around
$29 Billion. (Johnson & Johnson - Medical Device).
Johnson & Johnson’s future growth concerns include
changing healthcare needs for an aging population,
changing dynamics in the women’s health market, price
regulation, and developing minimally invasive surgery
procedures to reduce infections. Johnson & Johnson
continues to be the world’s leader of innovation among
biotech companies.
GE Healthcare
GE Healthcare is a sector of GE Capital, whose parent
company is General Electric (GE). GE Healthcare offers
transformational medical technologies and services that
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are shaping a new age of patient care (GE Healthcare).
In the third quarter of 2017, GE Healthcare had revenue
of $4.724 Million, with the medical device segment
recording a profit of $820 Million. The operation
profit of the third quarter of 2017 was 17.4%. GE
Healthcare’s main product categories include accessories
and supplies, the GE Health Cloud, bone and metabolic
health, advanced visualization, computed tomography,
clinical consumables, applied intelligence and anesthesia
delivery. The GE Health Cloud is “designed to be a
scalable, secure, connected and interoperable platform,
delivering the largest application ecosystem for the
healthcare industry” (GE Health Cloud). It is capable
of being connected to more than 500,000 GE medical
imaging machines and more than 1.5 million imaging
machines worldwide. GE Healthcare is making strides
in cloud technology to make the healthcare and medical
world more interconnected.
Porter’s Five Forces
The health of the medical device industry can be gauged
using Porter’s Five Forces, a common methodology
that guides analysis of an industry and the competitors
within it. Porter’s Five Forces are the threat of new
entrants, rivalry among existing firms, the availability
of substitutes, bargaining power among buyers, and
bargaining power among suppliers. Under the first
force, threat of new entrants, we find that it is extremely
difficult for new companies to enter this industry due
to high barriers from strict government regulations.
The industry is also dominated by a few large and top
companies who have strong brand images and long-term
reputations. Barriers to entry include strict regulations
by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA),
such as approvals, requirements, and registrations, as
well as copyrights and patents. One scholar explains
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the barriers of entry: “There are strict medical device
regulations for product approval by the FDA, which
include establishment registration, medical device listing,
PMA (501) K or premarket approval, investigational
device exemption (IDE) for clinical studies, quality
system regulation, labeling requirements and medical
device reporting (MDR). Couple this with the need for
copyrights and patents and the barrier rises even higher
to enter this industry” (UKEssays, 2017).
In regard to the second force, rivalry amongst
existing firms, there are eight major competitors in this
industry. They are Medtronic, Abbott Laboratories,
Johnson & Johnson, GE Healthcare, Tyco International,
Boston Scientific, Welch Allyn, and Siemens. The
medical device industry is rapidly growing and
constantly changing as a result of new innovations in
healthcare and technology. Products in this industry
are typically items found in hospitals, doctors’ offices,
emergency rooms, and other healthcare facilities. These
include items such as X-Ray machines, MRI machines,
beds, monitors, cardiac devices such as pacemakers,
internal cameras, IV bags, and more. These products also
have high fixed costs associated with them. The third
force is substitute products. There are no substitutes
for these products as they are very specific and cannot
conceivably be replaced. The threat of new substitutes, as
a result, is very low.
The fourth and fifth forces are the bargaining
power of buyers and suppliers, respectively. First,
buyers: quite simply, they do not have the ability to
force down prices. Hospitals and doctors’ offices may
be able to get deals or discounts when making bulk/
large or frequent purchases. Alternative suppliers exist
in competitors outside of the United States in Mexico
and Canada. The importance of these products to the
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buyers is evident: these medical devices save and improve
lives. The bargaining power of suppliers is different; they
can affect the industry with their ability to raise prices.
They can also contribute to making healthcare more
expensive. As stated before, the industry is dominated by
a few companies. Of the eight competitors, the top ones
are GE Healthcare, Johnson & Johnson, Medtronic,
Siemens, and Boston Scientific. Their products have
unique characteristics and are unique themselves.
Some examples of these products are artificial joints
and limbs, stents, orthopedic appliances, surgical
dressings, disposable surgical drapes, hydrotherapy
appliances, surgical kits, rubber medical and surgical
gloves, wheelchairs, anesthesia apparatus, orthopedic
instruments, optical diagnostic apparatus, blood
transfusion devices, syringes, hypodermic needles, and
catheters.
Methodology
Data on how these companies and products might
fare with the end of NAFTA can be organized into
two tables. The first of these is our External Factors
Analysis Summary (EFAS) table. The second table is our
Industry Matrix Analysis. These two tables are crucial
for planning strategies for the three companies we
focus on here: GE Healthcare, Johnson & Johnson and
Medtronic. By utilization of these tables, we can come to
some useful conclusions.
The External Factors Analysis table acts as a
means to track the external factors within an industry.
Prospective changes to NAFTA pose many possible risks
and opportunities for the healthcare industry. The EFAS
table helps clarify these opportunities and threats. Our
research relied on news of the current renegotiations
of NAFTA through news sites and online newspapers
(Harwood, 2017). During this research, it was difficult
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to indicate which possible outcomes could occur because
the negotiations changed pace so quickly and often
(Heath). The EFAS table lists the opportunities and
threats that came with each possible change, and how it
would affect the healthcare and medical device industry
as a whole.
Opportunities refer to the advantages that would
come with specific changes within NAFTA. Here, we
found five important advantages that would directly
impact the healthcare and medical device industry.
Opportunities included lowering the trade deficit
between the US and Mexico and getting rid of the VAT
(Harwood, 2017). Threats act as negative effects that
would hurt the current environment of the healthcare
and medical device industry. Here, we found five
threats, including the end of the Maquiladora program
and the end of resolution panels (Harwood, 2017).
These two direct elements could affect the medical
device industry, causing devices sold outside the United
States to be much more expensive. Given that a large
amount of manufacturing for medical devices is done
in Mexico, these two threats would increase the cost of
manufacturing these products and in turn cause them to
be more expensive for leading healthcare companies.
The second table is the industry matrix table, which.
allows us to organize our findings but also to narrow
down specifics to individual companies within the
United States, namely Medtronic, Johnson & Johnson,
and GE Healthcare. The industry matrix lists the
key success factors needed in order for each of these
companies to achieve success in the healthcare industry.
However, each company takes these success factors and
prioritizes them differently. By using the matrix table
we are able to show how GE Healthcare, Johnson &
Johnson, and Medtronic rank each of these success
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Figure 2: External Factors Analysis
External Factors
Opportunities:
Lower trade deficit between US
and Mexico
Get rid of VAT Tax
Eliminate unfair subsidies
Opportunity to impose tariffs
without permission to congress
Mexico develops internal
healthcare
Threats:

Weights

Rates

Comments

0.05
0.05
0.1

4
3
5

0.05

2

Lowers deficit with Mexico
Gets rid of added tax
Eliminates extra subsidies for healthcare
Allows tariffs to be added without the
approval of Congress

0.2

1.5

Mexico to develops their own healthcare

End of Maquiladora program

0.05

1

Update rule of origin

0.1

3

End of resolution panel
Medical devices from Mexico
more expensive
Potential loss of jobs/work
Total:

0.1

2

0.25
0.05
1.00

3
2.5

Ends the permit that allows Mexico to
import duty free
Ends the advice and discussion between
FDA and medical device sponsors
Medical devices from Mexico would
become more expensive

Figure 3: Industry Matrix Table

Key Success Factors
Innovation
FDA Approval
Product Development
Reliable Products
Top Service Maintenance
Sales and Marketing
Effectiveness
Product Lifecycle
Management
Reputation
Total:
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Johnson &
Medtronic
Johnson
GE Healthcare
Weighted
Weighted
Weighted
Weight
Score
Rating
Score
Rating
Score
Rating
0.2
1
5
0.8
4
1
5
0.16
0.8
5
0.8
5
0.8
5
0.1
0.4
4
0.3
3
0.5
5
0.15
0.6
4
0.6
4
0.6
4
0.12
0.36
3
0.6
5
0.48
4
0.08

0.4

5

0.24

3

0.32

4

0.13
0.06
1

0.52
0.3

4
5

0.52
0.3

4
5

0.52
0.18

4
3

63 • The Undergraduate Review • Special Issue • 2018

factors. This allows an overview of each company and
illustrates the main focuses of each leading healthcare
company. For example, by looking at the first key success
factor it, is clear that Medtronic and GE Healthcare list
innovation higher than Johnson & Johnson does (GE
Healthcare). At the same time, Johnson & Johnson
ranks service maintenance higher than both Medtronic
and GE Healthcare (Johnson & Johnson). This shows
that each company has different focuses and relies on
different key success factors in order to achieve success.
Findings
Based upon the information presented in the external
factor analysis summary and industry matrix analysis, we
can devise strategies for the three companies mentioned
above, both generally and in relation to possible
changes in NAFTA. For GE Healthcare, capitalizing
on innovation is paramount in importance given the
company’s goals noted in the industry matrix. It ranked
innovation as one of its top success factors and therefore
would be focusing on it in the future (GE Healthcare).
However, due to possible changes in NAFTA, GE’s focus
on innovation may prove costly. Mexico manufactures
a large amount of medical devices for these three
companies and if any of the threats listed in the EFAS
table occur, innovative technology will not be cheap. In
light of this, making operations more efficient through
automation will be useful should the outsourcing of
manufacturing result in increased costs. Overall, GE
Healthcare should continue to pursue innovation in
medical devices, especially in image archiving and cloud
visualization tools. Outsourcing and operation of devices
could become more expensive for factories in Mexico,
and therefore the company should work on ways to
make the operation process more efficient by using
automated robotics.
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In contrast, Medtronic should continue to
focus its efforts on charity in order to improve the
company’s reputation (Medtronic, 2016). By increasing
its focus on charity events and building a better
reputation, consumers will be more likely to trust
and use Medtronic healthcare and services. This type
of company strategy will bring more popular favor
toward it and set it apart from its competitors. Like GE
Healthcare, innovation is also important to Medtronic
and, because of that, automation is also a key factor
in Medtronic’s future success. Building the company’s
reputation will also cultivate more trust from consumers.
This will in the long run build clientele and give the
company a competitive edge. Finally, Medtronic should
also focus on automated manufacturing and increase
research in its diabetes group, since that is its lowest
profit group within the company. These key goals will
allow Medtronic to continue to flourish, even after the
NAFTA negotiations are complete.
Lastly, Johnson & Johnson should focus on
its work in the field of minimally invasive surgery (or
MIS) procedures (Johnson & Johnson). Evidence from
Johnson & Johnson shows that innovation within the
medical device field is not as important to the company’s
focus as it is to GE Healthcare and Medtronic. Instead,
Johnson & Johnson shows more interest in alternate
forms of innovation, including those that aim to reduce
infection rates. Emphasis on these procedures will set
the company apart from its competitors. Due to possible
changes from the NAFTA negotiations related to
manufacturing, Johnson & Johnson’s focus on innovative
procedures minimizes the need for reconfiguring its
business model. These require little need for outsourcing
manufacturing which may become more expensive as
a result of NAFTA’s renegotiation. MIS procedures are
also expected to be at a higher demand than they are
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currently, which will mean a competitive advantage for
Johnson & Johnson over its leading competitors.
Conclusion
The goal of this research project has been to analyze
the medical device industry and its ties to NAFTA. It
describes the context, business focuses and prospects for
three top companies in the medical device industry: GE
Healthcare, Johnson & Johnson, and Medtronic, and
considers how the scenario of the Trump Administration
pulling the U.S. out of the trade agreement would
affect each one. Our study identifies strategies that
each of the companies could implement if the Trump
administration were to pull the United States out of
the North American Free Trade Agreement. While
Medtronic’s focus on charity is a great way to improve
its reputation, the company should also increase research
in its diabetes group since that is its lowest profit group.
GE Healthcare should continue to increase innovation
in medical devices, especially in image archiving and
cloud visualization tools. Outsourcing and operation of
devices could become more expensive for factories in
Mexico, so the company should work on ways to make
the operation process more efficient with automation
by using robotics. Finally, Johnson & Johnson should
continue to focus its efforts on innovation in minimally
invasive surgeries (MIS) as well as other Healthcare
services. MIS procedures are expected to be at a higher
demand than they are currently, and this strategy
would give Johnson & Johnson an advantage over its
competitors.
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Debunking the Narratives
of Inclusion: Immigration
Policy in Quebec, Canada,
and the United States in the
Age of Trump
OLIVIA A. KURAJIAN

N

arratives of inclusion and successful
immigration stories permeate Canadian
popular culture. Often compared as
an equally desirable destination to the
United States, Canada is frequently heralded as a refuge
for immigrants; specifically, those seeking asylum.
Frequently exalted as a morally superior nation to its
southerly neighbors, Canada represents itself in the
international arena as a country that celebrates, respects,
and cares for all of its members—regardless of their
sometimes precarious immigration status by emphasizing
the multiculturalism of Canadian society. Such stories
also permeate national history and therefore leave out
the voices of the “other” and ignore episodes of overt
discrimination. As such, this account of the Canadian
narrative as a welcoming safe harbor is not always
accurate as globalization and concerns over national
security threaten to uproot the hegemonic perpetuation
of racial stereotypes and justifications of exclusion.
Illustrating these failures of the Canadian government
to uphold its revered image, are the stories of Abdoul
Abdi, a Somalian refugee who faced deportation after
the Canadian government neglected to apply for his
citizenship while he was a minor in the foster care
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system; and those of Haitian refugees once living in the
United States with protected status crossing into Quebec
by the hundreds in 2017 to seek asylum in Canada.
With the aid of the two aforementioned case studies,
explored through review of academic literature and news
stories, this paper seeks to dismantle the commonly
believed fallacies surrounding the immigration and
refugee policies in the United States, Canada, and
Quebec in the Age of Trump.
Stories are integral to the remembering of the
past and the shaping of the future. National narratives
are created, reinforced, and bolstered to suit political
motives. Sometimes, however, these narratives are
dissected and examined to reveal fallacies and insidious
hegemony. In the United States, Theodor Seuss Geisel,
more commonly known by his penname Dr. Seuss,
challenged national histories in his children’s books and
cartoons. Specifically concerned with environmental,
social, and political problems plaguing the United
States and world, Dr. Seuss is still celebrated today as
an activist and beloved storyteller. A political cartoon
from 1941 created by Seuss criticized America’s policy
on denying European Jews escaping the Holocaust entry
to the United States. It read, “…and the world chewed
up the children and spit out their bones. But those were
foreign children and it didn’t really matter.” Additionally,
the depiction of the mother figure is seen wearing a
shirt that boasts the words, “America First!” This type
of egocentric rhetoric mimics that of the political
climate of the United States in the Age of Trump as
neoliberal policies and laws restricting immigration to
the country are aimed to “Make America Great Again”
(Gilbert, 2017). This idealization of the role that strict
immigration policies can play in society can be a tool to
perpetuate discrimination. Yet, discriminatory policies
are not limited within the borders of the United States
BRIDGEWATER STATE UNIVERSITY

and are additionally visible in Quebec and Canada.
As a result, stories told in the United States,
Canada, and Quebec concerning immigration are not
only inaccurate, but also dangerous. Canadian popular
culture promotes multiculturalism and inclusion in line
with the country’s 1988 Official Multiculturalism Act,
which was passed at the federal level of government.
Yet, the reality of multiculturalism often differs from the
official policy as immigrant groups are often confronted
by barriers following their emigration from their home
countries. Instead of successful multiculturalism wherein
immigrants are encouraged to retain their heritage and
practice their customs, the reality is assimilationist
in nature (Lambert and Taylor, 1988). Hence, an
imagined collective national history minimizes the
plight of those unable to fit into this vision of the
typical Canadian immigrant that assimilates easily
into society. Quebec, with its additional immigration
policies and requirements, furthers the perpetuation of
exclusion within the Canadian federation as it favors
interculturalism rather than multiculturalism. The
paradigm of interculturalism seeks to unite diverse
groups and promote integration of newcomers into
society. Multiculturalism, as imagined by the Canadian
federal government, is founded upon the idea that all
cultures are equal and can exist more independently
of one another under the mirage of pluralism and
inclusion (Meer, 2016). Thus, interculturalism and
multiculturalism are tools that aid Canada and Quebec
in being viewed as more inclusive and less discriminatory
than their neighbors to the south, who are regarded
in popular culture as a “melting pot.” Canadian
exceptionalism often overshadows the crimes committed
against immigrants and asylum seekers north of the
United States border. The dialogue sparked through the
campaign and later election of United States President
BRIDGEWATER STATE UNIVERSITY

Donald Trump continues to unravel the alarming racism
embedded in American society and, thus, Canadians are
compelled to examine their own biases and problematic
immigration policies. The first case study to be examined
in this paper is the story of Abdoul Abdi, a Somalian
refugee who faced deportation after the Canadian
government neglected to apply for his citizenship while
he was a minor in the foster care system. The second
case study focuses on the plight of Haitian refugees once
living in the United States with protected status crossing
into Quebec by the hundreds in 2017 to seek asylum
in Canada. These two examples encapsulate the way in
which the North American continent is rife with racism
and exclusion, specifically in regard to immigration
policy and unofficial practice.
The official stories that these North American
nations promote are shockingly different, as the
narratives of “Land of the Free and The Home of the
Brave” and “The True North Strong and Free” contrast
with the reality of racism and exclusion. With the aid of
the two aforementioned case studies, explored through
a review of academic literature and news stories, this
paper seeks to dismantle the commonly believed fallacies
surrounding inclusivity of immigration and refugee
policies in the United States, Canada, and Quebec in the
Age of Trump.
Global migrants are charged with overwhelming
responsibility as they leave their homes and families
in search of settlement or seek asylum someplace else.
Application delays, financial difficulties, linguistic
challenges, unestablished or under-established ties
to the new community, or barriers to access to social
services are common (Aubrey, 2017). One of the
most difficult and important challenges faced by
refugees and immigrants is the access to healthcare
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both in their countries of origin and in their new
homes (Liu, 2016). As such, language barriers, lack of
information about how to access or navigate services,
long wait lists, and lack of culturally suited services in
the destination country contribute to the dilemma of
improper or insufficient healthcare amongst immigrants
to both the United States and Canada (Kalich, 2016).
Canadian exceptionalism is present in the reality of
public healthcare. While it is true that immigrants
can be eligible for coverage under the public plan, vast
inequalities exist in the care that is received and the
timeline in which it is provided (Lu, Kaushal, Denier
and Wang, 2017). For the very old and the very young,
this reality is felt even more strongly (Yeo, 2017). Long
waitlists for surgeries, difficulty in accessing family care
physicians and the price of pharmaceutical drugs can be
overwhelming to newcomers. Also, access to the public
regime of healthcare can take months to secure as there is
often a waiting period and varying criteria to be satisfied
before the issue of a card. This discrepancy between real
and imagined narratives can cause confusion and distress
in immigrant populations and can contribute to further
displacement and insecurities (Browne, Kumar, PuenteDuran, Georgiades, Leckie and Jenkins, 2017).
Furthermore, especially following the 2010
Haitian earthquake, Haitian migrants to the United
States spiked in numbers. Yet, under Donald Trump’s
administration, the protected status of these Haitian
nationals soon ended (Campbell, 2017). Haitians living
in the United States under this protected status therefore
have three choices. The first would be to go into hiding
in the United States and risk deportation and isolation.
The second choice is to return to Haiti at their own risk,
where the economic, political, and social conditions
are still dire. The third option would be to attempt to
cross into Canada, and most specifically Quebec, where
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the majority of the population speaks French. This
linguistic factor is especially important as knowledge
of the majority language directly corresponds to work
opportunities and education (Abelson, 2017). Many
Haitians that cross into Canada face a 90% rejection rate
for their refugee claimant applications, filed after illegally
entering the country (Campbell, 2017). Temporary
shelters, being in Quebec and Ontario, place further
burden on an already financially stressed and backlogged
immigrant processing system (Press, 2017). Haitian
refugee claimants make up a visible portion of the nearly
50,000 applications awaiting review in Canada this year
(Markusoff, 2018).
Consequently, discourses surrounding Haitian
asylum seekers that migrate from the United States to
Canada often ignore the direct contribution of these
two countries to the deplorable realities currently facing
Haiti, and more generally the global South (Esses,
2017). Policies of exploitation of labor and resources
have shaped Haiti both in colonial and neo-colonial
times. With Canada and the United States as active
participants in the problems facing Haiti, even more so
following the devastating earthquake at the beginning
of the decade, North America owes Haiti a substantial
debt. From environmental exploitation to human
displacement and dispossession, Canada and the United
States have ravaged Haiti. Moreover, the United States
explicitly removed its clause about America being
a nation of immigrants from the U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services mandate (Hjelmgard,
2018). The previous mission statement read: “USCIS
secures America’s promise as a nation of immigrants
by providing accurate and useful information to our
customers, granting immigration and citizenship
benefits, promoting an awareness and understanding
of citizenship, and ensuring the integrity of our
BRIDGEWATER STATE UNIVERSITY

immigration system.” The current mission statement
says: “U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
administers the nation’s lawful immigration system,
safeguarding its integrity and promise by efficiently and
fairly adjudicating requests for immigration benefits
while protecting Americans, securing the homeland, and
honoring our values” (Tropp & Okamoto, 2018).
Both the current and former statements
employ the word “integrity.” In the mandate put forth
by Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada
(IRCC), there is no mention of integrity and instead,
the Canadian government seeks to “maintain Canada’s
humanitarian tradition by protecting refugees and
people in need of protection” (Citizenship Canada,
2018).
The aforementioned “tradition” of protecting
refugees and the propagation of a just immigration
system is misleading. The tradition of the Canadian
government has been to exclude migrants from entering
the country’s borders based upon race and religion.
The tradition extends from Chinese Head Taxes to the
rejection of Jewish migrants escaping war-torn Europe
and the atrocities of the Holocaust. These policies, both
official and unofficial were rife with overt discrimination.
Meanwhile, around the time of Canadian
Confederation, thousands of British subjects were
welcomed with opened hearts. The open-door-policy was
viewed as a progressive and positive endeavour but was
laden with racism and exclusion (Décoste, 2014). This
imagined humanitarianism is further debunked with
the case study of 25-year-old, Abdoul Abdi. Abdi, who
came as a child and grew up alongside Canadian citizens,
never believed that he was anything but. As a minor
in the foster care system for over a decade, he should
have been properly cared for as a ward of the Canadian
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state. He recently was released from prison after serving
four-and-a-half years with charges including aggravated
assault.
Yet, following his release, he was immediately
detained by the Canada Border Services Agency
on immigration grounds. He spent months facing
deportation to Somalia, a country where he had never
set foot. He was born in Saudi Arabia to Somali parents
and following his mother’s death, Abdi came to Canada
at age six with his aunt. According a CBC article from
January 2018, Abdi wants the Canadian government
to do a better job with managing the foster care system
countrywide. The article goes on to say that now that
he is out of prison, Abdi said he is no longer a danger
to society and just wants to be a father to his child.
After spending his childhood in 31 placements within
Nova Scotia’s foster care system and with no secondary
education, Abdi wishes to remain a constant figure in his
child’s life (Zimonjic, 2018).
Just as Abdi’s child will grow up with the
influence of Canadian norms and narratives, Abdoul
Abdi was a product of the Canadian state (Williams,
2018a). Abdi’s story is not unique as religious or ethnic
minorities are often not given proper resources in the
foster care system. This furthers the notion that within
the social, political, and economic domains of Canadian
and American society there exists ongoing pervasive
racism and a deeply embedded colonial story (Williams,
2018b). As such, two advocacy groups have intervened
on behalf of Abdi for his judicial review. Both the
Canadian Civil Liberties Association and Justice for
Children and Youth groups believe that the country has
failed Abdi (Canadian Press, 2018). Abdoul Abdi stands
as a symbol of the inequality and racism woven into
Canada’s immigration policies and further diminishes
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the belief of Canadian exceptionalism.
The Canadian government’s detainment,
deportation, and deplorable treatment of certain
individuals in precarious situations of “status” within
Canada is often exacerbated if one belongs to a
racialized minority group. Yet, for immigrants to the
United States, obtaining American citizenship was
less “identity-changing” and more of a logical “next
step” in the procedural trajectory of naturalization. In
contrast to this bleak regard for citizenship, immigrants
to Canada were more likely to respond with pride for
Canadian citizenship and a feeling of inclusion within
the Canadian mosaic (Aptekar, 2016). However, these
responses were complicated and challenged by race and
status upon arriving in the new country.

with the looming reality that their protective status in
the United States is coming to an end in 2019. Excluded
from this account is Abdoul Abdi, a product of his
environment within Canada, not in spite of it. These
case studies are only two of the thousands each year that
serve to obliterate Canadian exceptionalism. Quebec,
Canada, and the United States in the Age of Trump
are just as they have always been. They have been, and
continue to be built on stolen land and both sustained
and bettered by diverse immigration. Whether or not the
national narratives will ever align with this reality is to be
determined.

Narratives of inclusion and successful
immigration stories saturate Canadian popular culture.
Often considered as an equally desirable destination to
the United States, Canada is frequently heralded as a
refuge for immigrants seeking asylum. Frequently exalted
as a morally superior nation to its southerly neighbors,
Canada represents itself in the international arena as
a country that celebrates, respects, and cares for all of
its members—regardless of their sometimes precarious
immigration status by emphasizing the multiculturalism
of Canadian society.
Such stories also permeate national history and
therefore leave out the voices of the “other” and ignore
episodes of overt discrimination. As such, this account
of the Canadian anecdote as a welcoming safe harbor is
not always accurate as globalization and concerns over
national security threaten to uproot the hegemonic
perpetuation of racial stereotypes and justifications of
exclusion. Excluded from these narratives are the Haitian
nationals seeking asylum in the Canadian federation
72 • The Undergraduate Review • Special Issue • 2018
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Fiat Chrysler
Automobiles and NAFTA’s
Rule-of-Origin Clause
CHRISTINE HOGAN-BERISHA and PARKER
MERRITT

O

ne of the most vocal opponents to the
Trump Administration’s proposed changes
to the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) is the automobile
industry because of the impact they will have on
the established rule-of-origin clause. The clause sets
eligibility rules for free trade within the NAFTA region
based on the percentage of a traded good’s components
that derive from the NAFTA region. Our perspective
on the issue is taken from the viewpoint of the Fiat
Chrysler Automobiles (FCA) Corporation. President
Donald Trump plans to increase the minimum required
percentage of U.S. components from approximately
60% to 85%, to which the established automotive
industry will not be able to adapt without sweeping
and costly supply-chain and infrastructure overhauls.
The Canadian Transport Minister has even begun
open dialog with Michigan’s Governor to emphasize
Canada’s concern over endangering the longstanding,
highly integrated auto industry and supply chain
connecting the two nations. This essay evaluates FCA’s
current performance; it scans, assesses, and analyzes
strategic factors to propose the best strategies for the
company in the face of the proposed changes to the
rule-of-origin clause.1 The Trump Administration’s
position on NAFTA is widely criticized and if achieved
will completely disrupt the auto industry and supply
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chain across the NAFTA member states. It has already
created uncertainty among automakers, and many had
to make swift changes to their business decisions in the
wake of Trump’s 2016 election. Whatever happens with
President Trump’s attempts to overhaul NAFTA, it is
clear that there will be winners and losers. As it stands,
the majority of automakers, including FCA, would say
that there are more winners under the current NAFTA
than they expect to be with Trump’s plan.
In an age where globalism rules, NAFTA fits
right in. NAFTA is the result of decades of slow progress
away from America’s isolationist stance on trade since
World War II. Its passage in 1994 created the largest
free market existing at that time by opening the trade
borders between Canada, the United States, and Mexico.
NAFTA is a multilateral trade agreement that allows for
the flow of goods and services between the three member
states with minimal obstruction in terms of tariffs or
excessive regulations. In its 24 years, the American
economy has adapted everything from manufacturing
to agriculture to commodities, and even its services,
to exploit its benefits of NAFTA. It is strongly favored
by entities such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
most conservative politicians, and virtually the entire
automobile industry.
The automobile industry is extremely difficult
to enter due to significant barriers such as capital
requirements, supply chains, logistics, labor, and legal

Editors’ note. This essay was written in early Spring 2018,
months before the October 2018 conclusion of negotiations
resulting in the United States-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement
(USMCA), the successor to the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA). This scholarship provides scholarly insight
into the subject that was available at that moment.
1
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and regulatory issues. There are dozens of competitors
across the NAFTA region and overall the industry
has been growing steadily in the United States and
globally. The automobile industry has tailored nearly
every component of its existence to take advantage
of the current NAFTA. Manufacturing, operations,
sales and distribution are all strategically located and
essentially the entire automobile industry supply chain
is configured to maximize profits under the existing
conditions (Howes, 2018). The largest potential
disruption to this is the threat of change to the rule-oforigin clause.
The rule-of-origin clause sets the required
percentage of a vehicle’s components that must originate
in the NAFTA region in order to avoid tariffs. At
present, 62.5% of the net cost of a passenger car or
light truck must originate from one of the NAFTA
member states. The Trump Administration’s proposal is
to raise that requirement to 85% of the net cost of the
vehicle (Siekierska, 2017). In addition, it is proposing
to mandate that 50% of the vehicle’s content originate
specifically from the United States by placing stricter
regulations on individual components’ country-of-origin
certificates. Presently, the country-of-origin certificates
do not receive as high a level of scrutiny. What the
Trump Administration proposes is a serious concern for
suppliers who fear that their materials will not meet the
new requirements.
Our analysis is based on a review of current
and historical news articles from established news
sources, government websites, and peer-reviewed
scholarly articles. All sources consistently report that
the automobile industry, including FCA, is not in favor
of altering the rule-of-origin clause (O’Grady, 2017).
Repeatedly, it is reported that the proposed changes
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would result in extreme disruptions to the automobile
industry’s highly integrated supply chain network,
producing increased automobile prices for consumers
across the NAFTA region (Vieira and Shaefer Munoz,
2018). The Wall Street Journal Editorial Board stated
that ultimately the changes would cause substantial
damage to the United States’ trade reputation and
potentially spark a trade war with its closest neighbors.
In the case of FCA, no source reports that CEO Sergio
Marchionne2 or top management are in favor of any of
the proposed changes to NAFTA. However, there were
numerous examples where the CEO expressed loud
opposition to Trump’s NAFTA proposals and strong
support for the existing NAFTA. He emphasized that
changes would hurt the autoworkers and result in higher
prices for consumers. This sentiment is echoed by the
majority of FCA’s competitors’ executives.
A look at FCA’s recent past and present
performance helps us to understand why. In 2009,
failing American auto manufacturer Chrysler Group
LLC filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and ownership of
the company was split between the United Auto Workers
Pension Fund, Fiat, the U.S. government, and the
Canadian government. Over the next few years under
the leadership of CEO Marchionne, Fiat slowly acquired
the majority ownership of the company and announced
that FIAT and Chrysler Group LLC would merge into a
new holding Company called Fiat Chrysler Automobiles
(FCA) (Vellequette, 2018). Founded in October 2014, it
is comprised of several automotive brands (Arbarth, Alfa
Romeo, Chrysler, Dodge, Fiat, Fiat Professional, Jeep,

Editor’s note. Since the writing of this essay, Sergio Marchionne
has passed away. He died on 25 July 2018 (www.bloomberg.com,
25 July 2018).
2
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Lancia, Maserati, Mopar, Ram, and SRT) and a few
component and production brands (Comau, Magneti
Marelli, and Teksid). According to its website, FCA’s
most profitable brands are Jeep and Ram (“About Us”).
FCA is the seventh-largest automobile
manufacturer in the world in terms of revenue, and
the eight-largest automobile manufacturer in terms
of production units. It has roughly 15 major global
competitors: Ford, GM, BMW, VW, Mercedes, Volvo,
Toyota, Nissan, Hyundai-Kai, Subaru, Honda, Mazda,
Tesla, Jaguar-Land Rover, and Mitsubishi. It is not a
major global supplier of automobile parts.
FCA’s current liquidity ratio - measuring its ability to
satisfy its short-term debts using short-term assets - is
0.77 and slightly decreased over the three-year period
ending 31 December 2017 (see Table 1). In this time,
CEO Marchionne aggressively paid down massive
amounts of long-term debt that was on the balance
sheet using cash on hand (Vellequette, 2018). FCA’s
cash over that same period decreased by $10B to satisfy
those long-term debts, while their short-term debts only
increased by $4B. Analysts predict that though FCA
does not have as much cash on hand as its competitors
such as Ford or Toyota, FCA will outperform Ford in
2018 partly because of the better financial position it has
achieved under CEO Marchionne (Lawrence, 2018).
FCA’s net profit margin (the amount of aftertax profit per each dollar of revenue written as a
percentage) is 3.15%, and was on the rise over the three
years presented in the table. Analysts have been pleased
by FCA’s performance and it is notable that its profit
margins have been more stable than its competitors’ over
this period (Lawrence, 2018). FCA’s net profit margin is
predicted to increase rapidly again in 2018, even though
CEO Marchionne has announced his retirement at the
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end of this year. He will be leaving the corporation in a
strong financial position.
The return on equity ratio (ROE) is one of
the ratios that investors care about the most. It is a
profitability ratio showing how much profit a company
generates with its shareholder’s money.3 FCA’s ROE for
the period ending in December 2017 was 17.40%. Since
its founding, FCA’s ROEs have been rapidly increasing
year after year, a pattern attributable to Marchionne’s
strong leadership and the success of the company’s Jeep
and Ram brands.
Industry Analysis: FCA’s Opportunities and Threats
The External Factor Analysis Summary (EFAS) Table
organizes the relevant opportunities and threats that
FCA faces as the Trump Administration reconsiders
NAFTA and the rule-of-origin clause. The Table allows
us assess specific factors in terms of weight. An average
company would receive a score of 3.0. FCA’s score (see
below) is 3.81, which demonstrates that it is responding
well to the factors and performing slightly above the
average company in the automobile industry. Five major
opportunities and six major threats are identified and
analyzed below.
The first opportunity (O1) for FCA is the
existing domestic and global demand for high-margin
SUVs (Bartosiak, 2018). The demand for traditional
passenger cars is diminishing and FCA’s present vehicle
lineup matches this scenario perfectly (Lawrence, 2018).
FCA’s second opportunity (O2) is the rise of global
demand for its Jeep and Ram brands. Jeep is one of

The ROE is calculated by dividing the net income figure by the
average stockholder equity.
3
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Table 1: Financial Ratios calculated from Yahoo Finance, 2018

Table 2: External Factor Analysis Summary – FCA and NAFTA
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the world’s most recognized brands because it has been
used since World War II by the United States Armed
Forces in missions all over the world. Additionally, Ram
trucks have a favorable reputation compared to their
competitors. The third opportunity (O3) available for
FCA to exploit is its extensive and established crossborder manufacturing and distribution network. FCA
has a highly integrated and interdependent supply chain
network throughout the NAFTA region, as well as South
America, Europe, and Asia, built on longstanding trade
agreements between nations, suppliers, and buyers.

LeBeau, 2018). This would significantly impact FCA, as
it would be forced to hastily adapt to the modifications,
which in turn would have a ripple effect on prices and
bottom lines (Meredith and LeBeau, 2018).

The second threat (T2) to FCA is rising interest
rates and falling used car prices. Historically, the threat
of rising interest rates has hurt new car sales and caused
used car prices to drop (Bartosiak, 2018). This results
in consumers choosing to buy used vehicles rather than
invest in a new ones. It causes some consumers to forgo
vehicle purchases completely, which would negatively
The existing NAFTA is FCA’s fourth opportunity affect FCA’s revenue.
(O4), simply because the entire auto industry has
The Trump Administration’s new tax laws are
evolved to thrive under this system. FCA, and
a third threat (T3) to FCA. In January 2018, CEO
automakers in general, are betting that time and reality
Marchionne announced that the new tax laws were the
are on their side and that the existing NAFTA will
direct catalyst for his decision to move some production
survive the Trump Administration’s threats to alter or
of Ram Heavy Duty trucks from Mexico back to the
dismantle it (Howes, 2018). It is a reasonable position to
United States (Lawrence, 2018). Even with the tax code
take since a disruption of the status quo would severely
changes, it will still be more expensive to manufacture
hurt Trump’s political voter base most of all. The last
those trucks in the United States as opposed to Mexico.
opportunity (O5) identified for FCA is its partnership
It is a costly (more than $1B) and time-consuming
with Waymo, the former Google car company. Due to
(projected completion in 2020) endeavor to reconfigure
its smaller size, FCA does not have the budget to allow
FCA’s existing manufacturing and supply chain
for unlimited or significant investment in necessary R &
infrastructure.
D to develop internally electric, hybrid, or self-driving
The fourth threat (T4) to FCA would arise
technology. Through its partnership with Waymo, FCA
should Trump act on his dangerously irresponsible threat
aims to convert its Chrysler Pacifica into a self-driving
vehicle in the near future (Bomey and Lawrence, 2018). to completely withdraw from NAFTA. This will result
in massive job losses not only at FCA and throughout
The first, and most heavily weighted, threat
the industry, higher costs to producers lower returns for
(T1) to FCA is the proposed changes to NAFTA’s ruleinvestors, and fewer choices for consumers. It would
of-origin clause. If adopted, the entire NAFTA region’s
create a less competitive American auto and supplier
manufacturing network and supply chain would be
industry as tariffs would then be applied at all levels of
completely disrupted. It would restrict automobile,
production and trade (Howes, 2018).
parts, and components trade, and would result in
material price increases for consumers (Meredith and
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Another threat (T5) to FCA is the industry’s
transition to electric and/or self-driving cars. Being
smaller than its competitors has caused FCA to neglect
investment in electric or self-driving technologies. FCA
is not currently equipped to compete with industry
leaders such as Toyota (i.e. Prius) or Tesla (i.e. Model
3) on this platform (Bomey and Lawrence, 2018). The
last threat (T6) FCA is currently facing is the Federal
Government’s lawsuit against it over diesel emissionsdefeat devices similar to those in Volkswagens (VW)
(Lawrence, 2018). CEO Marchionne has publicly
pushed back even though the U.S. Justice Department
is willing to settle. As of mid-March 2018, a California
court had decided to allow consumers to carry on
with their suit against Bosch, the manufacturer of the
components that facilitated the emissions violations in
the diesel Rams and Jeep Grand Cherokees. This does
not bode well for FCA as it will likely end up needing to
explain its side publicly in court.
Organizational Analysis: FCA’s Strengths and
Weaknesses
Our examination of the internal factors of the
automobile industry focuses on FCA’s specific strengths
and weaknesses, especially as they concern the rule-oforigin clause. Our results are presented in an Internal
Factor Analysis Summary (IFAS) Table (Table 3), which
allows us to assign weight to specific factors shaping a
company’s prospects. An average company would receive
a score of 3.0. FCA’s score of 3.39 demonstrates that it
is performing slightly above the average company in the
automobile industry. Eight major strengths and seven
major weaknesses are identified and analyzed below.
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Table 3: Internal Factor Analysis Summary – FCA’s Strengths and Weaknesses
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The first strength (S1) that FCA has is its new
commitment to invest $1B in its Warren (Michigan) and
Toledo (Ohio) plants. FCA plans to move production
of Ram Heavy Duty trucks from Mexico to Warren by
2020, and to build a new Jeep production facility in
Toledo (Lawrence, 2018). These moves will add 2,500
jobs to the metro Detroit area and help FCA avoid a
25% tariff if NAFTA falls apart (Shepardson, 2018).
FCA’s commitment to U.S. manufacturing and
employees is FCA’s second strength (S2). In January
2018, the company announced that employees,
excluding executives, would be receiving bonuses and
profit-sharing incentives due to new tax legislation
(Lawrence, 2018). This has enhanced FCA’s brand image
internally and externally, and it makes for good news
headlines. Undoubtedly, FCA’s CEO Sergio Marchionne
is a major strength (S3). He successfully ran Fiat since
the early 2000s, leading it out of the 2008 financial
meltdown, and was able to acquire Chrysler for pennies
on the dollar. He has a reputation for knowing how
to make money and is beloved by FCA’s employees
(Vellequette, 2018).
Globalization of Jeep and Ram brands is the
fourth strength (S4) that FCA has going in its favor.
Under Marchionne’s leadership, FCA was able to
take the Jeep and Ram brands to the global market
(Vellequette, 2018). FCA brands are now sold in South
America, Europe, and Asia, and are even projected
to outperform Ford in 2018. Another strength
(S5) identified is FCA’s ability to successfully strip
undervalued assets to return money to its shareholders.
Again, under Marchionne, FCA was able to sell off
CNH Industrial ($20.25B) and Ferrari ($22.34B). In
the near future, FCA is are planning to do the same with
its parts maker Magneti Marelli (Vellequette, 2018).
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The elimination of compact and mid-sized car
segments from FCA’s line up is another huge strength
(S6) because it allows FCA to focus on high margin
SUVs and trucks. It was Marchionne’s decision to
eliminate the Chrysler 200 and Dodge Dart, which in
turn freed up working capital to invest in manufacturing
capacity to expand the highly profitable Jeep and
Ram lines (Vellequette, 2018). FCA’s strong segment
performance is an additional strength (S7). Its North
America, Latin America, and Europe segments all had
outstanding 2017 performances, which contributed to
FCA’s $4.4B earnings before tax (beating out their 2016
$1.9B figure). As a result, Marchionne predicted that
FCA would be debt free by the end of Q2 2018. At the
end of 2015, its debt was more than $10.75B, but at the
end of 2017 it was down to $3B (Lawrence, 2018). The
last strength (S8) recognized is FCA’s Maserati brand
and its components divisions, where huge improvements
were made (Vellequette, 2018). These improvements
materially contributed to FCA’s strong 2017 financial
results.
On the weakness side, the first and most
important one (W1) is that CEO Sergio Marchionne’s
replacement has not yet been announced.4 Marchionne
will be retiring at the end of this year and FCA plans
to announce his successor in June 2018 at its 5-year
business plan meeting in Italy (Vellequette, 2018).
Speculation states that the new CEO will come
from within FCA, but losing the powerful figure
of Marchionne will have an effect. Another major

Editors’ note. Michael Manley replaced the critically ill Sergio
Marchionne as CFA’s CEO in July 2018. Manley had previously
been the head of FCA’s Jeep Division (www.reuters.com, 20 July
2018).
4
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weakness (W2) has been FCA’s painfully slow pace of
product renewal. For the most part, the company is still
running with an old lineup of vehicles, which it has yet
to improve (i.e. Dodge Journey, Chrysler 300, Dodge
Charger, Dodge Caravan, etc.).

electric or self-driving cars. FCA potentially faces huge
costs of developing, selling, and servicing these types of
vehicles. Electric Jeeps are not projected to be included
in FCA’s lineup until 2020 (Bomey and Lawrence,
2018).

A weakness (W3) that may be eliminated in
the near future (if Marchionne’s efforts and promises
pan out) is FCA’s unattractive debt. The company still
had $3B in debt on hand at the end of 2017; however,
analysts believe this is not terribly concerning because
of the company’s aggressive actions taken to pay it down
(Bomey and Lawrence, 2018).

Formulating a Strategy

The repeated delay of new product launches
is the fourth weakness (W4) identified for FCA. The
company has missed several release dates for promised
luxury SUVs, such as the Jeep Wagoneer and Grand
Wagoneer. This damages their image, and may cause
consumers and investors to look elsewhere (Bomey
and Lawrence, 2018). The fifth weakness (W5) for
FCA is their botched reintroduction of Fiat to the
U.S. Under Marchionne, FCA required U.S. dealers
to make extensive capital investments in new Italianstyle showrooms to segregate the Fiat lineup, instead
of showing it in existing Chrysler showrooms. This
made huge dents in profits from the Fiat line in the U.S
(Vellequette, 2018).
Another Marchionne-related weakness (W6)
for FCA was his refusal to sell off the unprofitable Alfa
Romeo brand to VW. Due to a personal feud with VW
CEO Martin Winterkorn, Marchionne rejected the
opportunity to sell Alfa Romeo to VW opting instead to
invest $6B into the brand. Unfortunately, Alfa Romeo
continues to be plagued with technical issues and has yet
to turn a profit (Vellequette, 2018). The last weakness
(W7) identified for FCA is that it does not yet offer
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When we combine FCA’s most significant opportunities,
threats, strengths, and weaknesses into a matrix called
the Strategic Factor Analysis Summary (SFAS), we
can develop strategies that FCA can use to deal with
potential changes to NAFTA’s rule-of-origin clause.
The SFAS Table organizes relevant external and internal
factors to enable strategic decisions to be made based on
the highest-weighted factors from the EFAS and IFAS
tables. These will help us predict the future success of
FCA. An average company would receive a score of 3.0.
FCA’s score of 3.91 demonstrates that it should perform
better than the average company in the automobile
industry in the near future. Using the SFAS Table, we
have generated three strategies for FCA to use to prepare
for any outcome related to NAFTA’s rule of origin
clause.
The first strategy (Strategy 1) for FCA is to
use S1 to exploit O2; that is, to use the new $1B
investments in the Warren and Toledo plants to exploit
the global demand for Jeep and Ram brands. This
can provide insulation from any potential changes to
the rule-of-origin clause and provide protection from
the 25% tariffs that would go into effect if NAFTA is
dissolved (Dawson and Stoll, 2018). Another bonus
is the eventual tax benefits that FCA will receive by
investing in domestic manufacturing facilities. The
cons to this strategy are that a sudden drop in demand
for Jeep or Ram brands could negate the investment
in the two plants, as they are slated to produce Ram
BRIDGEWATER STATE UNIVERSITY

Heavy Duty trucks and Jeeps in the U.S. where
production costs are higher. If the existing NAFTA
survives, this strategy will still be more expensive than
manufacturing in Mexico (Meredith and LeBeau, 2018).
Massive expenditures related to plant investment could
contribute to an even slower pace of product renewal or
the continued delay of product launches because cash

flows would be diverted away from these activities.
The second strategy (Strategy 2) for FCA is
to use S3 to exploit O4. FCA could encourage Sergio
Marchionne to use his power as a public figure to speak
out against changes to the current NAFTA even after
he retires. The pros to this are that he is a well-known

Table 4: A Strategic Factor Analysis for FCA
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and well-respected executive in the industry. He has a
charismatic personality that grabs the public’s attention
and he is beloved by the employees of FCA. He can use
this status to advocate and lobby on behalf of FCA’s
best interests. The cons to this strategy are that he is
retiring from FCA, so he may lose some of his ability to
influence policy and public opinion. His message against
making changes to NAFTA could be misinterpreted by
some as being against American workers. Additionally,
the new CEO may not have the same vision or opinions
as Marchionne.
The third strategy (Strategy 3) is for FCA to
use S4 to exploit O3. FCA must use the successful
globalization of its Jeep and Ram brands to exploit its
cross-border manufacturing and supply-chain network.
The pro to this strategy is that FCA gains access to
new and evolving customer bases around the globe.
This means that it may be somewhat insulated against
changes to NAFTA because international customers
will not be affected by modifications to the rule-oforigin clause. FCA already has existing manufacturing
facilities in South America, Europe, and Asia that can
respond to new global demands. The con to this strategy
is that if the Jeep and Ram brands suffer a sudden drop
in demand abroad, then FCA may be more deeply
impacted within the NAFTA region if the rule-of-origin
clause is altered. Political instability in other regions
where those brands are manufactured or sold is always
a threat to FCA’s bottom line. They must constantly
monitor and evaluate global and regional demand and
political situations so that they can react appropriately
to fluctuations in demand. They must be able to react to
changes and modify their supply chains as required or
make use of existing channels. All three of the strategies
outlined above would help FCA to hedge against the
effects from any potential outcome of the ongoing
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NAFTA renegotiations.
Conclusion
Canada, Mexico, and the American automotive industry
are not in favor of President Trump’s plans to renegotiate
NAFTA and modify the rule-of-origin clause, because
of the resulting disruption to the established supplychain networks and the subsequent price increases
expected for consumers (Howes, 2018). Fortunately
for Fiat Chrysler Automobiles, we do not expect there
will be any significant changes to NAFTA this year
(O’Grady, 2017). Additionally, it is even more likely that
negotiations will stall this year because of the polarized
American political climate and the 2018 midterm
elections. We expect that furthering the narrative
against the existing NAFTA will hurt the United States’
economy and trade reputation abroad. There are already
consequences to this rhetoric in that our closest trading
partners, Canada and Mexico, are actively seeking new
trade markets with countries like Brazil and China to
insulate themselves against potential transformations to
NAFTA.
We anticipate that FCA will be in a strong
position to weather any potential changes to NAFTA
and/or its rule-of-origin clause. We trust that that
they will continue to benefit from the existing state of
NAFTA in the meantime. Even with the impending
retirement of CEO Marchionne, it is evident that
FCA has many strengths that it can utilize to target
successfully the opportunities available in the face of
NAFTA’s uncertain future.
Our predictions must be qualified by some
limitations, however. The situation is hard to read
because of the Trump Administration’s inconsistent
message. The Trump Administration rarely gives a
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clear explanation of its intentions and often changes its
stance. This April, the Trump Administration changed
its position on NAFTA’s rule-of-origin clause, lowering
its regional demand for car content to 75% from the
original 85%, and has dropped its requirement that
50% of a car be made from U.S. content (Mauldin
and Hughes, 2018). Its hopes are that this will get it
closer to a deal with Mexico and Canada for a revised
NAFTA. This uncertainty is compounded by the fact
that renegotiations of NAFTA are not shaped only by
America. Canada and Mexico also hold substantial
power in the negotiations and there is political
uncertainty surrounding NAFTA in both countries.
Christine Hogan-Berisha is a Production and Inventory
Control Analyst at the Associates of Cape Cod, Inc. She has
a Bachelor of Science degree in Accounting and Finance,
with a Concentration in Accounting. She is currently
enrolled at Bridgewater State in the Graduate Certificate in
Accounting program and plans to take the Certified Public
Accountant exam.
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Aliens vs. Citizens: Who
are the Real Enemies of the
State?
SHELDON ALDERTON

I

n today’s political climate where nationalism,
protectionism and populism dominate the
political discourse, democratic values are being
interpreted in new ways. These interpretations
give rise to fundamental democratic questions, such
as: should certain aliens be allowed to have political
rights when they have been living in, and contributing
to, democratic countries for extended periods of time?
This paper will contrast the political position and
rights of Canadian citizens living abroad (expats) with
those of permanent residents (aliens) living in Canada,
demonstrating that the former have full democratic
rights despite being geographically disassociated from
domestic communities, while the latter are accorded
no democratic rights despite contributing directly to
the communities in which they reside. This raises the
question of whether it is morally permissible to withhold
democratic rights from certain aliens who contribute
to their host society more than full citizens of that
society who live abroad. Section one demonstrates how
democracy is a tool for the institutionalization of liberal
values. Section two shows how these values affect expats
and aliens unequally and in a manner that is contrary
to the values themselves, thus creating a statewide
injustice. Lastly, section three presents an argument for
eliminating the exclusion faced by aliens in order to
resolve the contradiction in liberal democratic values.
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There are three distinct types of aliens in Canada:
visitors, convention refugees, and permanent residents.
For the most part, this essay is not concerned with
the first two. This is because visitors are, as the name
suggests, only in the country for a short period of time.
They will not be there long enough to establish the
vested interest that is required to share in the collective
burdens and benefits of Canadian democratic society.
Convention refugees, defined by the United Nations
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, fall
into another category, with which this paper is not
concerned.1 Aliens, in the context of this paper, are
permanent residents. Applications for Permanent
Resident status must be made from outside of Canada
and applicants are selected according to the government’s
immigration criteria. Permanent Residents can be skilled
workers, entrepreneurs, investors, self-employed persons,
or family members of any of the aforementioned people.
Section I
Liberalism values individual liberty – the liberty to form
one’s own conception of the ‘good life’ – equality, and
autonomy. Democracies set out to promote and protect
individual liberty, equality, and autonomy. Therefore,
democracy is a tool used to institutionalize liberal values.
Because of this, democratic values parallel liberal values
– with minor variations. Democracies promote and
protect liberty by ensuring freedom of speech, freedom
of the press – even when it is criticial – and freedom
of assembly. Another way that democracies protect
individual liberty is in the form of negative rights.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Convention
and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,” accessed August
31, 2018, http://www.unhcr.org/protection/basic/3b66c2aa10/
convention-protocol-relating-status-refugees.html.
1
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Negative rights regard one’s ‘freedom from’ versus one’s
‘freedom to’ – meaning that governments cannot and
should not interfere with a person’s ability to access and
take advantage of those rights. Negative rights are the
rights to life, water, fresh air, and so forth. In the case
of Canadian democracy, all persons – citizens and aliens
– living within Canada’s borders enjoy these negative
rights.
Another value of liberalism institutionalized
by democracy is equality. There are many examples of
unequal democratic situations, but these are beyond the
scope of this paper. For now, it is fair to recognize that
democratic countries promote policies that, more often
than not, have the intent of equality and inclusion rather
than exclusion. Autonomy is another democratically
institutionalized liberal value. Liberalism views the
self as an autonomous individual capable of selfgovernance. In democracies, the tools are there for the
self to pursue political participation but that self must
begin this process on their own. The liberal self and the
democratic self are both viewed as unencumbered and it
is individuals who make up the whole. Liberalism and
democracy share abstract foundational values; however,
democracy also requires substantive values to promote
liberalism.
An important democratic value is political
participation. In order for a democracy to work
effectively, there needs to be political participation
from that democracy’s citizens. Politics is the preference
scheduling of society, or in the words of Habermas,
“the democratic process accomplishes the task of
programming the government in the interest of society.”2

Jürgen Habermas, “Three Normative Models of Democracy,”
Constellations 1, no. 1 (December 1994): 1–10.
2
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In order for government to know the interests or
preferences of society, participation needs to be realized
on a scale large enough to represent an adequate sample
of that society. The sample of preferences or interests
is then aggregated to the whole society to determine
governing policies. Another democratic value is rule
by the people. The Oxford English Dictionary defines
democracy as “a system of government by the whole
population or all eligible members of a state.”3 This is
a virtue because states that are governed by the people
they represent are generally seen to be more legitimate
and stable. This is because it is easier for the aggregate
of society to accept governance by their peers rather
than a foreign power. Also, this arrangement seems to
encompass a certain amount of empowerment. When
people vote, even if their candidates lose, they feel that
they were heard and that their interests were considered.
Because democratic governments are chosen by
the people of a society, and those governments are bound
to make decisions that benefit the majority of the people,
achieving a kind of common good, it can be argued
that democracy is the best way to achieve the common
good. This is interesting because it strays from the liberal
ideology slightly. Liberalism is concerned with ‘the right’
(or justice). It deliberately stays away from matters of
‘the good’ (or morality). By the good, we mean the
conception of the good life – the moral life – that
persons choose to live. Under the liberal lens, persons
are free – consistent with the liberal values mentioned
earlier – to pursue whatever conception of the good life
they wish. The liberal democratic state will not interfere
with one’s choice of the good life unless it interferes with

“Democracy,” Oxford Dictionaries | English, accessed August 31,
2018, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/democracy.
3
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another person’s. If someone’s conception of the good
life is counting the blades of grass in their yard, the state
has no right to stop them. But if someone else decides
that the good life is throwing rocks at their neighbours’
children, then the state has every right to forcibly make
them stop. Liberalism and democracy treat matters of
the good in different ways – total freedom according to
liberalism, restricted freedom according to democracy.
It makes sense that if people in democratic societies are
governed by their peers, democracy would be the best
form of government to achieve the common good for
those people – a form of governmental relativism.
Above are the substantive political values of
democracy that stem from the abstract foundational
values of liberalism. Additionally, from these values
come certain social privileges that persons residing in
democratic societies enjoy – freedom of speech, religion,
movement, and association. Aliens will be subject to
these privileges, with the exception of one: freedom
of movement. Freedom of movement is the freedom
to travel, live, and work anywhere one wishes within
the borders of a state and is a democratic privilege that
stems from the liberal values of liberty and autonomy.
Only some aliens are eligible for this privilege, however;
it is usually restricted. In this, there seems to be a
contradiction between abstract liberal values and the
substantive political application of these values. And this
goes against the assertion that “for liberals, some rights
are always grounded in a ‘higher law’ or … reason.”4
How, then, do the contradictions between political and

social rights and liberal democratic values affect different
groups of people within the liberal democratic state? Let
us explore them as they regard Canadian expats living
abroad and aliens living within the Canadian state.
Section II
Canadian citizenship is acquired via the English
Common Law concept of jus soli – right of the soil.
This means that as long as a child is born within the
geographic borders of Canada (unless the child is
born to a diplomat of a foreign country) that child is
automatically granted Canadian citizenship. This is one
of the reasons why Canada is so attractive to migrants
from other, less democratic, countries. Migrants know
that if they choose to relocate to Canada, their children
will be included in the Canadian social fabric by
virtue of birthright. The concept of jus soli is followed
in North, Central, and South American countries
but it “does not exist in Europe, Asia, Oceania or
most of Africa.”5 Recently, the Canadian Progressive
Conservative (CPC) party, at its party convention
in Halifax, Nova Scotia, moved to “fully eliminate
birthright [jus soli] citizenship in Canada.”6 This motion
came from the concern of birth-tourism. Birth-tourism
is when pregnant women travel to Canada for the sole
purpose of having their children on Canadian soil, thus
securing Canadian citizenship for the child. Suburban
Vancouver British Columbia, particularly Richmond, is

Tristin Hopper, “Why Does Canada Automatically Give
Citizenship to People Born Here?” London Free Press,” 28 August
2018, https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/why-does-canadaautomatically-give-citizenship-to-people-born-here.
5

Frank I. Michelman, “Conceptions of Democracy in American
Constitutional Argument: Voting Rights Concepts of Democracy:
The Case of Voting Rights,” Florida Law Review 41 (1989): 443–
90.
4
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said to be the epicenter of the birth-tourism epidemic.7
The reason to repeal jus soli in this case is to eliminate a
“free rider” scenario, though it is “estimated that there
fewer than 500 birth-tourists” exist.8 If there is a free
rider concern with birth-tourists, then this same concern
must be applied to Canadian expats – who make up a
much larger number than the former.9
In Canada, even ex-pat citizens who have chosen
to be geographically disassociated from the country
are able to enjoy the benefits of Canadian values and
privileges – regardless of whether they have the intention
of returning. Not only do expats enjoy many of the
benefits of Canadian democracy, they also benefit from
the privilege of carrying a Canadian passport. Initially,
this may seem to be a non-issue, but the following
example will show how this could disproportionately
affect expats and aliens, further highlighting the problem
of expat exploitation and free ridership.
Consider a Canadian expat who has lived
in country X for five years and has no intention of
returning; the expat no longer has living relatives in
Canada and has built a comfortable life in country X.
Now imagine a Canadian alien (Permanent Resident)
who is a business executive for a major corporation and
has been living in Canada for seven years with their
family and is in country X on business. For various

Paula Simons, “CPC Rejection of Citizenship Law Is the True
Threat to Canadian Values” Edmonton Journal,” 28 August 2018,
https://edmontonjournal.com/opinion/columnists/paula-simonsconservative-rejection-of-birthright-citizenship-is-the-real-threat-tocanadian-identity.
7

8

Hopper.

CBC News, “Estimated 2.8 Million Canadians Live Abroad,” 29
October 2009, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/estimated-2-8million-canadians-live-abroad-1.790218.
9
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reasons the alien has chosen not to go through the
process of becoming a Canadian citizen and holds
a passport for country Y. While both the Canadian
citizen and the Canadian alien are in country X, a
civil war breaks out. People are fleeing the country in
massive numbers and airports are overflowing trying to
determine who can leave and where they can go. The
Canadian expat, by virtue of a Canadian passport, would
be placed on the first flight to Ottawa. Meanwhile, the
Canadian alien is denied entry into Canada because they
are not a full Canadian citizen. The alien must either stay
in country X, where there is increasing danger or try to
get a flight to country Y – where their passport is valid.
In this scenario, the Canadian expat, who voluntarily
left the country and had no intention of returning, is
now safe on the ground in what is essentially a foreign
country to them. Meanwhile, the alien is still in danger
as they try to find a way back to a country they thought
was their home. It is easy to see how this seemingly small
detail – the ability to hold a Canadian passport – can
disproportionally affect residents of Canada.
Not only do Canadian expats get to keep
their passports, they do not pay any Canadian tax on
income earned outside Canada. It would be naive not
to mention that expats will surely pay into whatever
taxation system their country of residence deploys.
The reason for mentioning this point is twofold: first,
aliens in Canada are required to pay into Canada’s
taxation system; second, expats benefit from Canada
while contributing little or nothing in return. Canadian
expats essentially receive collective benefits of Canadian
society (except, as we note below, the right to vote)
while not sharing in the collective burdens. The lack of
a monetary contribution to Canadian society is just the
first side of this problematic coin. Canadian expats do
not contribute to the localities that make up the whole
93 • The Undergraduate Review • Special Issue • 2018

of Canada. These could be local economies, participation
in political parties or community associations, or even
simply participating in general community discourse.
While this generalization cannot be extended to all
Canadian expats, surely some do contribute as much as,
or at least close to, citizens within the borders. The fact
is, if they wanted to both completely disassociate and
still benefit, the current system of citizenship allows for
expats to exploit it. In other words, Canadian expats
are able to become free riders of the state with minimal
repercussions.
Section III
Intuitively, there seems to be a contradiction between
the liberal democratic values that Canada is founded
upon and access to the benefits these values create. It
has been shown that democracy values participation,
it has also been shown that the Canadian democracy
explicitly excludes members of its society from that
participation. This raises the argument that political
exclusion of aliens leads to a contradiction in the abstract
foundational values of the Canadian state. This political
exclusion must be corrected if Canada is truly to make
strides toward becoming a fully democratic and just
society. In other words, for Canada to achieve a society
that can be called fully ‘just,’ political rights must be
extended to aliens – especially as they are extended to
non-contributing, disassociated expats. Political equality
for aliens needs to be realized in Canadian democracy.
Democratic exclusion effectively equals democratic
injustice. In the current situation, Canada is effectively
using aliens, simply to benefit from them economically.
They pay into all Canadian tax programs creating a
steady stream of revenue for governments. Some of these
programs, like Employment Insurance and the Canada
94 • The Undergraduate Review • Special Issue • 2018

Pension Plan, will bar aliens from enjoying the benefits
these programs produce. The Canadian state advances
liberal values while at the same time turning its back on
aliens. If we are actively trying to advance certain values,
while working just as hard against those values, how can
progress be made? Canada needs to be a world leader
in the acceptance of aliens. Our global community is
becoming ever more connected and diverse, and Canada
is in a position to embrace this by allowing aliens to
access to its political arena.
Frédéric Mégret, an associate professor of
law at McGill, has recently penned an article entitled
“Why Expatriates Should Be Able to Vote.”10 In the
article Mégret give three reasons in support of his titled
conclusion. First, Mégret argues that expats “have a
vested interest in their country of citizenship”11 and
that if they are unable to vote Canada is “depriving
them of their only opportunity to exercise political
rights.”12 These two points can be looked at from the
point of view of Canadian aliens. Aliens also have a
vested interest in the expats’ country of citizenship,
maybe more so than the expats themselves. Aliens are
participating in the daily life of Canadian communities,
and have chosen to reside in Canada – which expats have
chosen to leave – and this conscious choice shows which
party was thinking more about their vested political
interests. Secondly, Mégret says that expats are “affected
by the law and policies of Canada,”13 aliens, being fully

Frédéric Mégret, “Why Expatriates Should Be Able to Vote,” The
Globe and Mail, 2 April 2018, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/
amp/opinion/article-why-expatriates-should-be-able-to-vote/?__
twitter_impression=true.
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Mégret.
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Mégret.
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immersed in Canadian society, are clearly affected by the
laws and policies of Canada as well. Lastly, it is said that
expats “do a considerable amount for Canada, directly
or indirectly.”14 Again, this does not seem to be a feature
exclusive of expats. Aliens may do more for Canada in
the sense that they are contributing to the social fabric of
Canadian society more so than expats. It can be argued
that if Canada is to extend political rights to expats for
the reasons highlighted by Mégret, they can also be
extended to aliens for the same reasons. Habermas wrote
that “members of … solitary communities become aware
of their dependence on one another.”15 If this is true,
then aliens could be more beneficial to Canadian society
than expats by virtue of participating in that solitary
community directly.

contradictory value injustices. Joseph Carens, a political
scientist at the University of Toronto, writes about
the same issues under the lens of temporary workers:
“democratic justice requires us to provide temporary
workers with most of the rights enjoyed by citizens and
residents.”16 Carens’ conclusion should be extended to
all aliens who reside in Canada for extended periods of
time.

Joseph H. Carens, “Live‐in Domestics, Seasonal Workers, and
Others Hard to Locate on the Map of Democracy,” Journal of
Political Philosophy 16, no. 4 (March 25, 2008): 419–45.
16

Conclusion
This discussion of expats vs. aliens began with a
demonstration of how democracy is a tool for the
institutionalization of liberal values. From there it
was shown how these values affect expats and aliens
disproportionately in a way that is contrary to the values
themselves. It was then demonstrated how this creates
statewide injustice. In conclusion, an argument was
presented for eliminating the democratic exclusion faced
by aliens in order to resolve the contradiction in liberal
democratic values. If Canada is to be a fully just and
democratic country it needs to embrace globalization
and lead the way in eliminating policies that create

14

Mégret.

15

Habermas, “Three Normative Models of Democracy.”
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